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No. 2

National Planning for a Public
Works Program

NORMAN M. PEARSON
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

As the allied armies push back the axis enemies to defeat, the nation must give thought to preparation for peace. Demobilization will bring with it the need for providing for an orderly transition to peace-time employment for the returning soldiers and workers in war industries. It is taken for granted by a large number of people, economists and laymen alike, that a federal public works program of some sort will be essential in maintaining full employment during the transition period.¹ If a federal public works program is to be ready to serve this function, the top administrative arrangements made to direct it are of considerable importance. Macmahon, Millett, and Ogden have told the story of the great confusion and waste which resulted in the 'thirties when the first really substantial federal public works program had to be put into effect without adequate preparation.² It is of the utmost concern to every one in the nation, therefore, that ad-

¹ Of recent interest are the following recommendations for the use of public works programs: the Baruch-Hancock Report, *War and Post-War Adjustment Policy*, Senate Document No. 154, 78th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, 1940), 27-28, 39; Senator George's Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, *Post-war Economic Policy and Planning*, Senate Report No. 539, Part 4, 78th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, 1944), 7; *Recommendations of the Twenty-sixth Conference of the International Labor Organization*, House Document No. 621, 78th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, 1944), 1, 13-14; Wendell Willkie recommended that the Republican party include in its 1944 platform a plank on public works if they are needed, *Time*, 26 June, 1944, VXLIII, 22.

² A. W. Macmahon, J. D. Millett, and G. Ogden, *The Administration of Federal Works Relief*, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941.

vance plans for the construction of genuinely useful public works be ready if and when needed, that they be properly timed and located geographically, and also that they do not conflict with one another. The planning of public works must also be closely related to general national planning for the use of human as well as physical resources.

Following the liquidation of the National Resources Planning Board in August, 1943, the Budget Bureau by Executive Order 9384, October 4, 1943, was made solely responsible for the advance planning of a national public works program. Such a move is of great interest not only because of the importance today of the federal budget in the national economy, but also because of the Budget Bureau's function as the general administrative staff of the President.³ In order to understand the status of public works planning today as the demobilization period approaches, let us outline the developments prior to the issuance of Executive Order 9384, the meaning of the order itself, and what has happened since its issuance, all to the end of knowing whether a federal public works program will be planned and available for use if and when needed.

TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS WORLD WAR I

A public works program to stabilize employment following a great war is by no means a new idea. During World War I much thought was given to the problem of shifting persons back to peace-time industries without an intervening period of unemployment; however, as a recent study of public works programming after the first World War revealed, very little actual planning was accomplished or put into effect.⁴ Although a number of pos-

³ N. M. Pearson, "A General Administrative Staff to Aid the President," *Public Administration Review*, IV (Spring, 1944), 127-147.

⁴ E. Jay Howenstine, Jr., "Public Works After World War I," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 51 (Dec., 1943), 523-537. Among the states only Pennsylvania had appointed a public works agency or provided funds for one.

sibilities for public works programs existed in connection with the buying policy of the Railroad Administration and ship construction, no federal program of public works emerged. Several abortive steps were taken; for example, Baruch was reported in 1918 to be completing plans for a building construction program; and Senator Kenyon introduced a bill, which was defeated, for the establishment of an Emergency Public Works Board to spend \$100,000,000 during periods of unemployment on public works projects, including aid to the states and through them to the cities. Failing to carry out a public works program itself, the federal government advocated construction programs for state and local governments and for private industries.⁵ That these measures failed is shown by the fact that in 1919 private and public construction had not yet returned to the pre-war level, to say nothing of making up wartime deficiencies, and that a depression followed in 1921.

Howenstine concludes that Congress was chiefly responsible for the lack of a federal public works program after World War I.

Failure to stimulate state and local governments and private construction, he says further, was due to the fact that the federal government (1) in its buying policies did not encourage construction, (2) could not reduce the high cost of construction, and (3) did not provide adequate machinery for making and marketing real estate loans.⁶ In addition, there was also the general reaction against government activity following a period of war-time restructions, the change in political parties, and ruffled executive-legislative relationships. Finally, it is significant that during World War I and immediately afterward, two important central staff agencies to strengthen Presidential leadership were lacking—a national budget agency and a national planning agency.⁷

⁵ Thus the War Labor Policies Board encouraged principal cities of the United States to resume work immediately on projects that had been postponed during the war. At the annual Conference of Governors, in 1919, each state was urged to enact a "Standard Public Works Act." In addition, a Division of Public Works and Construction Development was organized, December 30, 1918, in the Department of Labor, which sponsored an "Own your own home" campaign in some 78 cities.

⁶ Howenstine, *Loc. Cit.*, 537.

⁷ Hearings were begun on the Budget and Accounting Act in 1919.

DEPRESSION, BOOM, AND DEPRESSION, 1919-1931

The depression of 1921 revived speculation about the use of public works to ameliorate the fluctuations of the business cycle. One of the objectives of the President's Conference on Unemployment in September, 1921, which Secretary of Commerce Hoover spearheaded, was the expansion of the public works of the federal government to balance the business cycle. The National Bureau of Economic Research, which had been designated to do the technical work for the conference recommended use of private and public construction as an excellent method of controlling the crest of the boom and ameliorating the depression. The enactment of the Federal Highway Act of 1921 put into practice the idea of using public works to combat the depression. In November, 1921, Senator Kenyon introduced a bill, in the same spirit as his bill of 1919, to carry out the recommendations of the President's Conference, authorizing the federal government to prepare "for future cyclical periods of depression and unemployment by systems of public works" by preparing and currently revising a comprehensive list of public works projects and developing a monthly *Survey of Current Business* for comprehensive data on production, trade, and commerce. This bill did not pass, however. As soon as the building boom in 1923 ushered in "permanent prosperity," long-range planning of public works was unable to emerge from the theoretical stage. A policy of postponing the planning of public works during the twenties was in harmony also with the prevailing policy of retrenchment in government expenditures.

Definitive action by the federal government toward planning a comprehensive public works program did not come until the great depression following 1929. In 1930 President Hoover appealed to state and local officials to pursue public works projects; he also established in the Department of Commerce a Division of Public Construction to "aid in coordinating the work of the Federal Government bureaus carrying on construction and the efforts of the state and local governments." Not until two years after the onset of depression, however, did Congress pass the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, which incorporated the philosophy, advocated unsuccessfully before by Senator Kenyon, of using public

works to ameliorate the business cycle. But the policies of this act were not given effect until later, for public works construction still bowed to even further retrenchment of the activities of federal government.

During the twenties there was no central planning agency. The Budget Bureau, which was created in 1921, was first used as an economy agency in administrative management, and throughout the period from 1921-1931 was unconcerned with economic policy.⁸

TRENDS IN THE THIRTIES, 1931-1939

The next eight years were characterized by a considerable development both in the theory and the practice of national planning agencies. Each step cannot be discussed in detail, but the two primary developments can be outlined briefly, namely, the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 and the agencies operating under it, and the National Planning Board and its successors.

The Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, which was passed by Congress as the country sank deeper and deeper into economic depression, embodied the economic doctrine that government public works should be constructed during the times of business depression in order to stabilize industry and to minimize unemployment. The Employment Stabilization Board, composed of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor, was established by the act to determine the conditions of employment and business and the volume of public works necessary to stabilize industry. It never became really significant, however, perhaps in part because of the modest scale on which Congress had authorized public works construction to meet a depression of unprecedented size, and because the economic doctrine underlying the functions of the Board was not acceptable at the outset to the new administration and the new Cabinet which were taking office in 1933.

When it became clear, however, that the new administration was going to pursue a program of government expenditure for public

⁸ N. M. Pearson, "The Budget Bureau: from Routine Business to General Staff," *Public Administration Review*, III (Spring, 1943), 126-149.

works, Executive Order 6166, June 10, 1933, abolished the Federal Employment Stabilization Board as an independent agency; and its functions were transferred to the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works "if and when said administration is authorized and established." But when that administration was established, the functions were not transferred. Instead, that administration established, on July 30, 1933, as part of its own organization, the National Planning Board, the early forerunner of the National Resources Planning Board, "to prepare a comprehensive program of public works"; and the staff of the Federal Employment Stabilization Board was forgotten, perhaps because of its origin in the previous administration, until Executive Order 6623, March 1, 1934, transferred its functions to a newly created Federal Employment Stabilization Office in the Department of Commerce.

On June 30, 1934, Executive Order 6777 created the National Resources Board as an independent agency on the general authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act and abolished the National Planning Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, as well as the Committee on National Land Problems, which had been created on April 28, 1934, by Executive Order 6693. The functions of the new board were stated in rather general terms, actually inclusive of the functions set forth in the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, as follows:

"To prepare and present to the President a program and plan of procedure dealing with the physical, social, governmental, and economic aspects of public policy for the development and use of land, water, and other national resources and such related subjects as may from time to time be referred to it by the President."

A year later, on June 7, 1935, Executive Order No. 7065 replaced the National Resources Board by the National Resources Committee, which was "to provide a means of obtaining information essential to a wise employment of the emergency appropriation" made by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, approved April 8, 1935. As in the case of its immediate predecessor, the National Resources Board, its functions were stated very broadly and no mention was made of the Federal Employment Stabilization Office in the Department of Commerce. Both of

these boards had essentially the same membership, which included the membership of the original Federal Employment Stabilization Board except for the Secretary of the Treasury, and in addition included the Secretary of Interior as Chairman, the Secretary of War, the Federal Employment Relief Administrator, and three named individuals—F. A. Delano, C. E. Marriam, and W. C. Mitchell, who constituted an advisory committee to the board and also directed the planning staff. In 1939 Reorganization Plan I abolished the Federal Employment Stabilization Office and transferred its functions to the newly established Executive Office of the President, to which the National Resources Committee was also transferred to carry out those and other functions as the National Resources Planning Board.

In retrospect, four facts stand out during the period of public works planning from 1931 to 1939:

1. The Budget Bureau was not considered an important factor in public works planning or in the coordination of the public works plans of federal agencies, either from the economic or the administrative viewpoint. It is true that the Employment Stabilization Act stated in section 8d that the public works plans of federal agencies were to be "submitted to the Board and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget," and that "the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President from time to time consolidated plans and estimates." Since the Employment Stabilization Act had fallen into disuse, however, and since the Budget Bureau was not staffed to do more than a rather mechanical review of budget estimates, these provisions were not carried out.

2. The development of two series of national planning agencies for public works, one evolving from the Federal Employment Stabilization Board, created by the Employment Stabilization Act, of 1931 and continued in the Federal Employment Stabilization Office; and the other originating in the National Planning Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, and later branching out under independent status in the National Resources Board, and the National Resources Committee.

3. The unofficial transfer of the work of the Employment Stabilization Office to the Public Works Administration.

4. The merger, in Reorganization Plan I, in 1939, of the two separate series of planning agencies into the National Resources Planning Board.

THE BUDGET BUREAU AND THE NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, 1939-1940

In 1940 Executive Order 8455 brought the Bureau of the Budget into an effective working relation with the National Resources Planning Board in the development of national plans for public works. This order was the outgrowth of several important developments. In the first place, the fact that many of the emergency projects had to be undertaken quickly and without benefit of carefully drawn plans (resulting in a multitude of useless or "leaf-raking" projects) was responsible for the increased acceptance of the idea of the "advance planning and regulated construction of public works" originally stated as objectives of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931. There was also increasing realization that in large public works programs two objectives must be reconciled: (a) the construction of worthwhile projects, and (b) the provision for employment, neither criterion alone being sufficient. Consequently, it was thought undesirable for the advance planning function to be performed in an employment agency; and that it would be better to carry out both functions in a national planning agency having a scope broader than the construction of public works projects or the relieving of unemployment by federal agencies. Incidentally, the uselessness of the Office of Economic Stabilization of the Department of Commerce was recognized, as was the undesirability of the unofficial performance of its advance planning function by the Public Works Administration. From the administrative point of view, however, perhaps the most significant development was the realization that public works planning must be integrated with budgeting, especially as regards the public works of the federal departments. By 1940 the Budget Bureau had expanded its staff sufficiently to be of considerably more assistance in the coordination of plans for public works projects to relieve unemployment.

The joint responsibility of the Budget Bureau and the National Resources Planning Board for public works programming was thought to be a very desirable arrangement.⁹ But even before the issuance of Executive Order 8455 on June 26, 1940, the National Resources Planning Board had lost favor with Congress. In the Independent Offices Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1941 the Board was limited strictly to the performance of the functions of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931. The subsequent appropriation acts for 1942 and 1943 contained a similar limitation and the Board itself was abolished, as of August 31, 1943, in the Independent Office Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1944. During this time its economists and social scientists were attacked vigorously by Congress. Similar forces in Congress also attacked members of the fiscal division of the Bureau of the Budget, which had interchanged personnel with the National Resources Planning Board to some extent.¹⁰

It is rather obvious that Congress was still in agreement with the purposes and functions of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, which limited public works to the construction of physical engineering projects by federal agencies under proper authorizing legislation. It is also safe to assume that the broader functions of the National Resources Planning Board involved inevitably the preliminary formulation of national policy on crucial problems of human, economic, and social, as well as of physical, resources. Conflict resulted because Congress regarded the formulation of national policy as its own responsibility. With the liquidation of the National Resources Planning Board, the Budget Bureau was

⁹ Charles E. Merriam, "The National Resources Board," *Public Administration Review*, I, (Winter, 1941), 116-120; also A. N. Holcombe, "Over-All Financial Planning Through the Bureau of the Budget," *Public Administration Review*, I, (Spring, 1941), 225-230.

¹⁰ Alvin Hansen and Gardner Means, for example, who were vigorously attacked by the Tydings Committee as members of the Fiscal Division of the Budget Bureau, have been employed from time to time by the NRPB. U. S. Congress, Senate, Sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Transfer of Employees, Conserving Office Space, Relief in Housing Conditions, and Promotion of Efficiency and Economy*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942).

left without its joint partner in the performance of its responsibilities for public works programming under Executive Order 8455. It was natural to expect, therefore, that an order, such as Executive Order 9384, would be issued to reorganize the functions.

THE BUDGET BUREAU AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 9384

Executive Order 9384 can perhaps be best understood if its provisions are examined in relation to those of Executive Order 8455, the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, and the Executive Orders creating the National Resources Board, the National Resources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board. The title and Section 1 of Executive Order 9384 indicate as its purpose "to facilitate budgeting activities," and as its legislative authorization the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Though there is no further mention of any other purpose or basic authority in Executive Order 9384, Section 8d of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 contains specific authority for this Order.¹¹ The purpose of Executive Order 8455 is "to facilitate and assist in the advance planning of construction undertaken by the federal government . . ." (Section 2); and it includes the purposes of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 implicitly by reference. The Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 is perhaps most explicit in its statement of purpose both in its title, and in Section 8a which states:

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to arrange the construction of public works so far as practicable in such manner as will assist in the stabilization of industry and employment through the proper timing of such construction, and that to further this object there shall be advanced planning, including preparation of detailed construction plans of public works by the construction agencies and the board."

The character of the economic purposes of this act are further elaborated in Sections 3a, 4a and 4b, 5, 7, and 8b, which refer to such factors as the volume of government contracts, the Department of Labor index of employment, and the activity of general business. Though the purpose of the National Planning Board

¹¹ Section 8d reads: "Such programs, plans, and estimates for the six-year period shall be submitted to the board and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President from time to time consolidated plans and estimates."

of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works was stated to be the preparation of a comprehensive program of public works, the purposes of its successors, the National Resources Board, the National Resources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board, were much more inclusive, covering long-range planning for human, economic, and social, as well as for physical resources, until the National Resources Planning Board was limited to the purposes of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, beginning in July 1, 1940.

Regarding the nature of the public works plans themselves, Executive Order 9384 provides (1) that all departments and establishments of the executive branch "now or hereafter authorized by law to plan, propose, undertake, or aid public works and improvement projects financed in whole or in part by the Federal Government" shall do the planning; and (2) that they shall prepare "carefully planned and realistic long-range programs of [public works and improvement] projects" (Section 1). As in the case of its earlier prototype, the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, this order places the primary responsibility for public works planning on the executive departments and bureaus; and the central agency, in this case the Budget Bureau, will coordinate these plans rather than do the actual bulk of the planning work itself. It is obvious also that there is not envisioned as refined a concept of planning as in the case of Executive Order 8455, where specific procedures were outlined for preliminary surveys, a timeless "shelf of projects," a six-year program of public works projects drawn from the shelf the first year of which was integrated with the budget, a reporting of the beginning of construction, and a reporting of the completion of construction. This planning was essentially a self-contained administrative system, with procedures and forms quite distinct from those used in the regular administrative operations of the federal departments. Executive Order 9384, on the other hand, can be understood more clearly as a movement to integrate advance planning of public works with existing budgetary practice. In the determination of estimates, particularly in regard to dams, highways, and other physical engineering structures, a careful consideration of future

plans and costs is indispensable in the approval of initial aspects of the work. This advance planning phase of budgetary practice, however, has not been formalized before, nor perhaps has sufficient attention been given in the division of estimates of the Budget Bureau to the point of view of planning. Section 2a of the latest order clearly requires a more formal and systematic submission of advance plans for public works at the time any estimate for appropriation for public works is submitted.

The planning of the National Resources Board, the National Resources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board was, of course, on a much broader basis with considerably greater emphasis on the centralization of the planning activity itself and with perhaps insufficient attention to the planning carried out by federal operating agencies. There were no apparent legal limits to the sorts of studies and plans which could be made, and considerable attention as given to coordinating planning by state and local governments. For example, Executive Order 6777 says simply that the Board shall prepare plans for the President, without referring to the relation of such plans to the plans of federal agencies; and the orders establishing the National Resources Committee and the National Resources Planning Board spoke merely of "consulting" with the federal agencies.¹²

In regard to administrative management, two provisions of Executive Order 9384 stand out: (1) the requirement that advance plans be submitted as part of the justifications whenever an estimate of an appropriation is submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for any public works or improvement projects (Section 2a); and (2) the designation of the Director of the Budget as solely responsible for reporting to the President "consolidated estimates and advance programs in the form of an over-all advance program for the Executive Branch of the Government" (Section 3). Though Executive Order 8455 did not specifically provide for the integration of public works plans with estimates submitted

¹² In general, these national planning agencies were conducted in conformance with the recommendations made by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937.

to the Budget Bureau, practice under it provided that the first year of the six year advance program would contain the same projects as the estimates to the Budget Bureau for that year. On the other hand, though the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 provided rather specifically for the relating of the public works plans to the budget process, actual practice kept the two functions apart. The practice of the National Resources Board, the National Resources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board until 1940 provided for no integration of advance plans with current budget estimates. In regard to the second point, Executive Order 8455 provided that the Director of the Budget Bureau and the Chairman of the planning board should act jointly; it mentions no report of consolidated plans or estimates to the President either jointly or by the Budget Director alone. Section 8d of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, on the other hand, provided that the advance plans for public works be submitted by the federal agencies to the Board and to the Director of the Budget and that "the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President from time to time consolidated plans and estimates." The work of the National Resources Board and the National Resources Committee from 1934 to 1939, and also of the National Resources Planning Board until 1940, was not specifically related to that of the Budget Bureau.

The fact that two different groups of national planning agencies had been concerned with the planning of public works raises the question as to the definition of "public works." Neither Executive Order 9384 nor its predecessor Executive Order 8455 defines public works. The Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, while not attempting any abstract definition, specifically named not only the construction agencies themselves, such as the Bureau of Public Roads, but also the specific legislation, such as the Federal Highway Act. It is quite clear that it contemplated no public works other than the ordinary physical engineering structures such as roads, buildings, and dams. Though the National Planning Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works was established to prepare a comprehensive program of "public works," its successors, the National Resources Board, the National Re-

sources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board, had functions much broader than ordinary physical engineering works under the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935, and Executive Order 8248. Even when the appropriation act limited the National Resources Planning Board, beginning July 1, 1939, to the performance of the functions of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, it continued to spend the same amount of money as before. In view of the experience of the National Resources Planning Board with Congress, the "public works and improvement projects" of Executive Order 9384 have been interpreted to include only plans for physical engineering projects authorized by law.

Finally, Executive Order 9384 represents a further step in facilitating legislative-executive relationships. Section 2b provides that the departments shall submit with their estimates for making advance plans "the additional legislation, or amendments to existing legislation, that may be necessary to bring projects in their advance program to an appropriate state of readiness for prompt undertaking when and where needed."¹³ In addition, Section 1 makes the order itself applicable only to agencies "authorized by law to plan." In other words, no detailed plans are to be made for projects as yet unauthorized by Congress. This provision, though possibly implied, was not specifically made in any previous law or executive order relating to public works programming.

Executive Order 9384 also provides that all reports on legislation proposed by the Department or pending in Congress on proposed advanced public works programs shall be cleared by the Budget Bureau. This requirement is also contained in Executive Order 8455 (Section 6) as the responsibility of the Budget Bureau alone. These provisions are similar to the requirements in existence since 1921 and most recently stated in Budget Circular A-19, as of August 1, 1943, which specify that all reports on legislation proposed by the

¹³ This provision was also contained in a memorandum of May 22 from the President to the heads of departments and agencies requesting that they submit proposed supplemental estimates of appropriations necessary for planning post-war public works projects.

departments or referred to the departments by Congress for advice shall be cleared by the Budget Bureau for "advice as to its relationship to the program of the President." There was no provision in the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931 for the preparation and submission to Congress by the executive branch of a "legislative program." This idea, of course, has caused some resentment by members of Congress. It would appear that perhaps insufficient attention was given to the matter of legislative authorization by the National Resources Board, the National Resources Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board until 1940, although a considerable number of reports of studies made were submitted to Congress from time to time.

TRENDS SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9384

Before setting forth the developments in public works planning since the issuance of Executive Order 9384, let us describe briefly the manner in which the Budget Bureau conceived its functions under that order, and its proposal for putting them into effect. This proposal was first publicly revealed in an estimate for supplementary funds transmitted by the President to Congress on the date of the issuance of the order, which requested \$355,300 for the Budget Bureau for four main purposes, one of which was "to carry out the function of consolidating and coordinating public works programs which federal agencies are now required by law to develop and maintain."¹⁴

The following day, October 5, Director Smith outlined his proposal at the hearing before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Deficiencies. He emphasized (1) the need for relating long-range plans to current budgetary proposals; (2) that planning in the first instance was the operating responsibility of the departments and establishments; and (3) that "the Bureau of the Budget has the responsibility of insuring that estimates for public works had improvements are based on a carefully thought out program,

¹⁴ Communication from the President, House Document 326, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 2.

that they do not impinge upon or conflict with programs of other federal agencies, and that the estimates of appropriations recommended to the President for presentation to Congress represent orderly progress in our national development and bear proper relationship to each other."¹⁵ In answer to a direct question from Representative Cannon, Smith said the Budget Bureau would not be concerned, except very indirectly, with the use of federal public works to relieve any unemployment which might result from the demobilization of the armed forces and the discharge of war industry workers.¹⁶ The Budget Bureau's function was really a much simpler one of coordination—"to iron out conflicts between the projects presented by the federal agencies." To Representative Wigglesworth's inquiry as to whether the Budget Bureau was not taking over the functions of the National Resources Planning Board, Smith replied that though the Board had planned to do the same job it had not completed it and that at the present time "there is not a public works program."¹⁷ In other words, Director Smith took the approach outlined in Executive Order 9384; in addition, however, he did cite his authorities under the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, Section 8 (d), though he held that the Budget Bureau would not be concerned with the "employment stabilization" aspect of that act.

As for organization, the Director proposed that a public works unit be established in the Budget Bureau, consisting of 37 persons to start with, of which 22 would be professional engineers, to deal with five kinds of physical engineering projects—flood control, river and harbor improvements, public roads, public buildings, and power developments.¹⁸ The cost of this unit for six months of fiscal year 1944 was estimated at \$93,445. Although there had been sufficient legal authority prior to the issuance of Executive

¹⁵ Hearings of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 3598, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 840.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 871-872.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 875.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 840. The unit was to be headed by Col. Waite, formerly Deputy Administrator of Public Works.

Order 9384, apparently no one in the Budget Bureau was employed on public works programming at the time of the hearing.¹⁹

The trends in public works programming since the issuance of Executive Order 9384 in October, 1943, are revealed largely in the consideration by Congress of two appropriation bills—H.R. 3598, reported in the House, November 4, 1943, and H.R. 4070, reported in the House, January 26, 1944. During the discussion of H.R. 3598, the "First Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill for 1944," the Budget Bureau proposal was obscured by the fact that over-all economy was the principal issue.²⁰ In the hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Deficiencies very little indication of attitude was recorded, though, as noted above, the question of similarity of the proposed function to the work of the abolished National Resources Planning Board was discussed. In its report, the full Committee on Appropriations, while praising the Budget Bureau generally, reduced its total estimate of \$355,000 to \$175,000, presumably an "economy" action, which the House approved without debate.²¹ In the Senate, although there was no discussion of public works before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Deficiencies, the full Committee, in its report to the Senate, deleted the entire Budget Bureau supplemental item.²² The only apparent explanation, offered on the floor of the Senate by the chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator McKellar, was that the Budget Bureau, as the budget agency of the government, should not present requests for supplemental funds to Congress.²³ The Senate agreed to the action of the Appropriations Committee without debate; but in the process of conference between the two houses, agreement was finally reached to appropriate \$75,000.²⁴ In this first test, though a small sum was appropriated, there was some doubt re-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 875, 880.

²⁰ Congress reduced the total supplemental estimate of over \$1,200,000,000 submitted by the President by 85%.

²¹ House Report No. 822 on H. R. 3598, pp. 4-5; Congressional Record, 5 1943.

²² Senate Report No. 570 on H. R. 3598, p. 16.

²³ Congressional Record, 8 December, 1943, p. 10461.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Public Law 216, 78th Congress, 3.

garding the extent to which Congress really endorsed the Budget Bureau public works unit.

The next test came in the consideration of the regular annual budget estimates for the Budget Bureau in H.R. 4070, the "Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for fiscal year 1945." Director Smith's proposal, which was presented to Congress in the President's annual budget in January, 1944, included an estimate of \$153,680 for fiscal year 1945. In the hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, it was explained more on the basis of the Employment Stabilization Act than upon Executive Order 9384.²⁵ In other respects the proposal was about the same. Though other issues, particularly the proposed field offices of the Budget Bureau, again overshadowed public works planning, Representative Hendricks gave an indication of the final action of the committee when he observed that the work of the proposed public works planning unit seemed similar to that of the NRPB, and also when he expressed the opinion that Congress rather than the Executive Branch should do postwar planning, having in mind especially Senator George's Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning.²⁶ Representative Case raised the issue of an alternative method of coordinating public works, involving inter-departmental clearance rather than the Budget Bureau; but Director Smith felt that this method was inadequate.²⁷ In its report to the House, the full Committee deleted the entire public works planning estimate, and the House approved it without debate, the only item involving public works programming being the insertion in the Record by Representative Case of a quadripartite agreement on public works projects entered into by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Power Commission exemplifying interdepartmental coordination.²⁸

In the Senate before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Director Smith asked for restoration of the full

²⁵ Hearings of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 4070, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1945, 78th Congress, 2d Session, 926.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 949-952.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 939.

²⁸ House Report on H. R. 4070, p. 5; *Congressional Record* 27 January, 850.

amount for public works planning eliminated by the House. At this hearing, public works planning was associated with the work of his field offices. In addition, he pointed out that since federal agencies were spending upwards of \$13,000,000 during fiscal year 1944 for postwar planning, they required coordination.²⁹ While the public works programming was not discussed at all by the members of the Sub-committee, the field offices were discussed very critically. The report of the full Appropriations Committee to the Senate confirmed the House action, and the matter was not made the subject of a conference or of any further debate in either the House or the Senate. Although there may have been doubt as to Congressional attitude during passage of H. R. 3598, consideration of H. R. 4070 revealed definite opposition to public works planning by the Budget Bureau, even though it included only administrative management aspects.³⁰

Policies of the Budget Bureau toward the Departments.—After the issuance of Executive Order 9384, the policy of the Budget Bureau toward departmental requests for planning funds was to wait until Congress acted on its supplemental request for financing the public works programming unit. The President, however, in his Memorandum of May 22, 1943, had called for estimates of funds needed by the departments for post-war planning, and, as observed above, Executive Order 9384 substantially incorporated the request. Following the appropriation made in H. R. 3598, the Budget Bureau waited for a more complete endorsement of its proposal by Congress in the review of its regular annual appropriation. In January, 1944, the proposal was rejected by the House, and by March 24, the Senate too had rejected it; which meant that there could be no public works unit in the Budget Bureau beyond July 1, 1944. Currently, the Budget Bureau is not transmitting estimates for post-war planning funds from the departments to Congress, be-

²⁹ Hearings of Senate Committee on appropriations on H. R. 4070, pp. 247-248.

³⁰ Substantiating further this conclusion was the elimination of funds in the Budget Bureau appropriation for the Federal Board of Hospitalization, which was to coordinate the huge federal hospital building program of the Army, Navy, Veteran's Administration, Public Health Service, and other federal agencies; funds for this work had been approved in H. R. 3598.

cause the situation does not permit a governmental program to be submitted. At no time since the issuance of Executive Order 9384 almost a year ago has the Budget Bureau issued regulations or policies for the guidance of the departments.

Departmental Plans for Public Works.—The present inactivity of the Budget Bureau does not mean that the various federal departments and agencies are not drawing up post-war plans.³¹ The fact that a number of agencies have had a total of about \$13,000,000 appropriated for post-war planning during fiscal year 1944 shows that Congress draws a clear distinction between the planning work of bureaus and the "coordinating" work of a central planning group. Thus, for fiscal year 1944 the Corps of Engineers received \$6,000,000 for flood control planning and \$2,500,000 for planning river and harbor improvements; the Bureau of Reclamation, \$900,000; the Public Roads Administration, \$3,000,000; the Public Buildings Administration, \$500,000; and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, \$250,000. Other agencies, as shown by the Galloway survey, are doing as much as they can under funds already appropriated. For example, in the Department of Agriculture since 1941 an Interbureau Committee for Post-War Programs has been at work developing plans for agriculture in the post-war world. But leadership is needed by both the Congress and the President if a national program of public works is to be ready.

CONCLUSIONS

During the last twenty-five years since World War I, leadership in the executive branch and in Congress in the planning of a public works program to ameliorate the fluctuations of the business cycle has been largely non-existent or wavering and uncertain. Public works programming was not of much concern to the Budget Bureau from the time of its creation in 1921 until 1940. Established in response to demands for economy in federal expenditure, during the twenties it was used as an instrument for securing further retrenchment in federal activities. From 1931

³¹ See George B. Galloway, *Post-war Planning in the United States*, New York: the Twentieth Century Fund, 1942. Part II has directory of planning agencies and activities.

to 1939, even though it had authority under the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931, it did not play a significant role in the emergency relief program. Following the reorganization studies by the President's Committee and Brookings Institute, however, it expanded both in size and in scope of functions, and in 1940 was made jointly responsible with the National Resources Planning Board for public works programming. After three years of joint partnership it became solely responsible for public works programming under Executive Order 9384.

Though the Director of the Budget, in his recent proposals to Congress, conceived the function of public works programming primarily in terms of administrative management rather than employment stabilization, Congress did not act upon this apparent distinction. In neither of the congressional tests was the issue of public works programming directly considered and debated. It was submerged by considerations of general economy and reaction against supplemental appropriations, proposed field offices for the Budget Bureau, the Federal Board of Hospitalization, and the general antagonism between Congress and the President. Nevertheless, there was a clear indication, borne out by the end result, that Congress felt that it, rather than an agency in the executive branch, should determine post-war planning policies and programs, including those for public works. This attitude on the part of Congress grew in part out of its controversy with the National Resources Planning Board, which undoubtedly proved a handicap to the Budget Bureau.

In the problem of using a federal public works program to provide employment in the post-war period we have a domestic issue, involving the location of policy formulation as between the executive and Congress, comparable to that involved in post-war foreign policy. In either case, if Congress and the executive branch each insists that it should have the sole responsibility, a disastrous stalemate will result. It was largely for this reason that both foreign policy and public works bogged down at the end of World War I. The solution, this writer feels, lies in some sort of joint working arrangement between Congress and the executive branch.

Secretary Hull is now working closely with a joint committee of the House and Senate on post-war foreign policy. For the present, a post-war public works program remains stalemated.

There is a striking parallel between the status of public works programming at the close of World War I and its status today in the final phases of World War II. We may well experience a depression as we did in 1921, but a much more catastrophic one. The parallel shows:

1. Large numbers of people will have to be shifted from the armed forces and war-time industries.
2. War weariness and reaction against government activity in regulating many of the ordinary aspects of life has created a widespread predisposition against public works.
3. No central planning agency, either in Congress or the executive branch.
4. Lack of effective leadership in the office of the President in coordinating planning done by the several departments and agencies.
5. Possibility of a change of administration to one less favorable to government intervention in the national economy.
6. Most important of all, as a result of the above factors, no crystallization of a policy on the basis of which a federal public works program could be undertaken and used to maintain employment.
7. Finally, dependence of state and local governments on the federal government's policies in regard to public works, particularly in view of their expectations for funds from the U. S. Treasury.

Once again, we even have Bernard Baruch, in his report on re-conversion, advocating development of an adequate public works program.³²

There exist today, however, some grounds for the hope that the parallel will not conclude with a post-war depression, as in 1921. The idea of planning federal public works to offset the business cycle has received strong support in Republican and Democratic administrations alike. The actual use of public works on a large scale during the thirties further strengthened the idea. The expenditures of the present war have dwarfed the seemingly formidable public debt due to public works during the past decade, thereby tending to weaken opposition on that ground to a similar program. Perhaps the chief criticisms of that year were directed, not toward the idea of public works, but toward the administration of the program. Many of the faults, such as leaf-raking and

³² *Op. Cit.*, 39.

other unnecessary projects, resulted from the lack of advance planning.

One writer, after examining trends in national planning in the United States prior to 1933, came to the conclusion that national planning in the United States is largely "a story of 'plans for planning' that have germinated only to die stillborn."³³ While much progress has been made since 1933, the generalization is still valid. If the United States is to have an effective public works program, it must do more than "plan for planning." It must plan. And to plan, there must be a staff agency either in Congress or the executive branch, or a joint staff serving both.

³³ Clifford J. Hynning, "Administrative Evolution of National Planning in the United States in the Pre-New-Deal Era," *Plan Age*, V (June, 1939), 189.

Some Readjustments of the Texas Negro Family to the Emergency of War

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The history of the American Negro family has been characterized by a sizeable degree of instability. Like other institutions, its instability has come in response to the many changing conditions to which it had to make some type of adjustment. The demoralization that appeared in the Negro family between 1860 and 1900 was to a great extent, an expression of the changing sense of values that accompanied the transition of the Negro from a slave to a free economy. There is also evidence that much of the disturbance in Negro family life between 1900 and 1930 resulted from a shift of Negroes from rural to urban areas on the one hand, and from southern to northern areas on the other. These new patterns of settlement made new demands upon the Negro population group, rendering many previously established patterns of behavior inadequate.¹

Such instability is expressed in the behavior of all social institutions when faced by the factor of acute social change. Previous researches by many scholars have shown that, over a period of time, institutions as well as individuals establish definite patterns of adjustment to the world that surrounds them. When severe changes occur in their world, old patterns of adjustment are rendered inadequate, and institutions or individuals become frustrated until some new balance is achieved and adjustment becomes more certain.² This effect may be expressed in changes in the rate of family formation or changes in the entire structure and functions of the family.

¹ E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family In Chicago*, (University Chicago Press, 1932).

² For institutional adjustment resulting from culture contact, see J. O. Kertzler, "Culture Contact and Institutional Change" in E. B. Reuter, *Race And Cultural Contacts*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1932), 48-56.

INTRODUCTION

In accepting these propositions to be true, this research assumed the possibility of constructing a problem of investigation around the idea that the present war emergency has made necessary readjustments in Negro family life similar to those occurring in other American families. However, it was believed that the occasion for such new adjustments in Negro family life has been conditioned by the factor of minority group status. Therefore, the central question of this paper is: What readjustments have taken place in Negro family life as a result of war emergency, and to what extent have these readjustments been conditioned by the factor of minority group status?

In order to get a definite answer to this hypothetical question, specific indices of family readjustment were selected. These indices are given in the form of the following subsidiary questions:

1. What changes have taken place in the formation of the Negro family?
2. To what extent have these families found it necessary to shift their place of habitation as a result of war?
3. Has the emergency of war been associated with changes in the economic and social functions of the family?
4. Have these changes been accompanied by crises that reflect the factor of minority group status?

These indices have been selected because it is believed that they represent important features of the family structure and functions, and because they are susceptible to measurement. It became possible to compare the state of the family before 1941 with that since 1941 when it was recognized that the full swing of the American war effort had been in operation for a sufficient period of time to observe institutional effects. Therefore, such changes as had occurred in the family between these two time periods—where there was evidence that these changes were associated with war—were defined as readjustments made necessary by the emergency of war.

The scope of this study has been confined to 1000 Texas Negro families selected from various towns and cities in East Texas according to the proportional representation of the Negro popula-

tion in these areas. Because of the probable inadequacy of the sample no attempt has been made to draw generalizations that apply to all Negro families in the state. From the point of view of time, the historical background of these families was not considered. There was only interest in getting a picture of specific aspects of family organization as they existed prior to 1941 and in comparing them with the picture as it existed in December 1943.

The method of investigation included letters, schedules, and notes from field interviews as sources of information. Fifty Negro family heads were selected from strategic areas in East Texas, and were asked to write letters giving an account of how the present war has affected their families. When these letters were received, they were classified according to type and used as a basis for constructing a field schedule. This schedule was used as a guide for interviewing those families included in the study.

CHANGES IN FAMILY FORMATION

The emergency of war has facilitated significant changes in the rate of formation of the families included in this study. While encouraging the creation of families through marriage and child birth on the one hand, the existing emergency has influenced the dissolution of families on the other hand. Neither aspect of this two-way process has been without its personal and institutional crises.

Some evidence of the tendency of these families to form during the war emergency is seen when the per cent of families whose heads married between 1938 and 1940 is compared with those marrying between 1941 and 1943. Of the total group of families studied, only 2.0 per cent were headed by couples who married during this first time-period, while 14.8 per cent of these families were headed by couples who had married during the latter period. Case materials revealed that most of the marriages of the latter period involved men who had been called to the army recently or expected to be called very soon. Marriages were broken among these families almost as rapidly as they were formed. There were 116 divorced families included in the group. Only 1.0 per cent of


these divorces occurred during the period of 1938-40, while 13.2 per cent occurred during 1941-43.

The encouragement of births by the war period seems equally as great. Almost one fifth or 19.0 per cent of the families had children born since 1941, but only 6.0 per cent had children born during the three year period prior to this time. Although these facts represent no proof that such changes would not have occurred had no war existed, other studies show that similar changes have occurred in American families as a whole and during each war period that has been represented in our history.³

CHANGES IN PLACE OF RESIDENCE

The very nature of our war economy necessitates the shift of our population from one place to another. These families suggest no exception to this rule. Of the total number of families included in the study, 8.6 per cent had moved during the three year period prior to 1941, while 39.0 per cent moved during the three year period following 1941. Approximately 70.0 per cent of the families that moved during the latter period changed residence within the city, and 22.0 per cent moved from one city to another but within the state. Almost all of the remaining families had moved into Texas war factory centers from nearby states.

CHART I



PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF 390 TEXAS NEGRO FAMILIES
ACCORDING TO REASONS FOR MOVING SINCE 1941

³ Ruth S. Cavan, *The Family*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1942), 401-403.

There is further evidence that the movements occurring during the latter period resulted from the war situation. Since the presence of war industries in many centers of Texas has caused a labor vacuum, there has been a shift of Texas families toward these centers. This concentration of population has greatly affected the housing situation. All of the Negro families who had moved since 1941 gave work or housing as a reason for moving. Chart I shows 66.0 per cent of these families moved in order to be nearer their place of work. Changes in jobs have been associated with increase in wages, and this increase has resulted in the efforts of many families to improve their housing situation. This is evidenced by the fact that 34.0 per cent of those families that moved were either seeking to improve their housing conditions or were forced out by those who bought the houses in which they were living.

TABLE I

NUMERICAL AND PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF 303 TEXAS NEGRO FAMILIES HAVING MEMBERS LEAVING HOME FOR WORK, ACCORDING TO MEMBER LEAVING


MEMBER LEAVING	NUMBER	PER CENT
Father	75	24.7
Mother	32	10.6
Son	116	38.3
Daughter	80	26.4
TOTAL.....	303	100.0

The shift of the family as a whole is not a sufficient index of the effect of war on residential change. In many instances where whole families did not change their residence, specific individual family members did make such a change. Over 30.0 per cent of all families studied possessed members who had left home in response to the job-call in other areas. Over three-fourths of these members had moved outside of the state to such areas as California, District of Columbia, Michigan, and the state of Washington. Table I shows that this process of the mobility of family members has been selective. On the one hand children have moved more readily than parents. On the other hand, sons have moved more readily than daughters.

CHANGES IN ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF FAMILY MEMBERS

Considerably more than in the case of change of residence, these Negro families have experienced shifts in occupational interests. There are signs that the traditional occupational pattern of the southern Negro has been completely shattered by the emergency of war. The families represented in the study possessed 1,700 gainful workers prior to 1941 but 2,226 such workers after 1941. This represents an increase of approximately 31.0 per cent in the tendency of family members to seek gainful occupations. This rate is not as revolutionary as it may appear. A sizeable amount of this change represents merely a shift from the status of unpaid family workers to that of the gainfully employed.

CHART II



PER CENT DISTRIBUTION 526 NEW WORKERS OF TEXAS NEGRO
FAMILIES ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC FAMILY MEMBER

However, the shift was selective in nature. It represented the gradual tendency of the nation to draw on its supplementary labor reserve in times of war. Of the 526 new workers presented to the labor market by these families, 81.5 per cent were sons and daughters of the family. This fact is shown by Chart II.

TABLE II

PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF WORKING MEMBERS OF 1000 TEXAS
NEGRO FAMILIES ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION
BEFORE AND SINCE 1941

OCCUPATIONAL DIVISION	LAST BEFORE	LAST AFTER
	1941	1941
Agriculture	17.9	.6
Manufacturing, etc.	3.9	59.8
Trade	7.6	1.4
Public Works	1.6	.3
Transportation	10.6	17.2
Public Service	1.4	.1
Professional Service	8.6	.8
Domestic and Personal	47.6	17.2
Clerical Services8	2.5
TOTAL.....	100.0	100.0

Further evidence of the influence of war on the traditional occupational pattern of these Negro families is reflected in the differences in the type of occupations followed before 1941 and since 1941. The occupational pattern of these family members before 1941 was mainly one of agriculture and domestic service. These two occupational divisions included approximately 66.0 per cent of all family workers. However, after 1941 the picture had changed considerably. These two divisions, then, included only 17.8 per cent of all family workers. On leaving the farm, these workers were moving into a new type of work pattern. They were shifting into the occupational fields of manufacturing and transportation. Whereas these two divisions included only 14.5 per cent of the family workers before 1941, they included 77.0 per cent of these workers after 1941.

This shift in the general occupational pattern of these family members has created its effect both on the members concerned and on the family welfare as a whole. It has meant bringing Negro workers from the familistic pattern of agriculture to the individualistic pattern of our great factories. It has meant changing these Negroes from the paternalistic pattern of inter-racial relations characteristic of domestic and personal services to the more competitive pattern of our factory and transportation economy. This shift in the nature of established human relations has


resulted in intense racial conflicts. The members of the respective families who have experienced this conflict situation reveal that most of them occur during the time of travel to and from work, where status on the job is questioned, and where employer and employee do not have a clear understanding concerning the wage scale.

The type of racial conflicts that have developed incidental to crowded intra-urban transportation is illustrated by the verbatim record of a Negro woman employed at one of the war plants of a large Texas city:

One morning I had caught the bus trying to get to my work on time. I was getting to my stop and when I rang the bell to get off the bus driver wouldn't stop. So I rang again, but he didn't stop. At this time he was almost to the end of the line. I said I'd wait until he came back and then get off. At the end of the line the driver said, "You will have to pay another fare, we're at the end of the line." I told him I rang the bell but he wouldn't stop. The conductor said I was a lie. By that time another colored woman came up and paid my fare.

Another family worker reported that she had a "run in" with a bus driver while coming from work because he told her to "sit where you bounce." One of the sons of a family reported that he was threatened with discharge for drinking out of the water fountain of a machine shop, although no segregation fountain was available. Several persons interviewed reported conflicts between white and Negro workers because white workers protested against the salaries paid Negro workers. In some instances conflict was generated between Negro workers and white employers when the latter sought to lower the wages of the former in response to the protest of white workers.

CHART III



FREQUENCY POLYGON SHOWING PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS OF 1000 TEXAS NEGRO FAMILIES ACCORDING TO WAGE AND JOB CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER 1941

In spite of these conflicts one may say that the shift in occupational pattern has proved beneficial to the Negro family from the point of view of our national values. The trend of our war economy has been of such nature that there have been increases in wages both for those changing jobs and for those not changing. However, the shift has been motivated by the fact that higher paying jobs attracted low wage earners. Chart III shows the per cent distribution of family workers according to wage, and compares the wage scale of those changing jobs after 1941 and those not changing jobs. Where family members did not change jobs, the average weekly wage increased from twenty-one dollars to twenty-six dollars. Where these members did change jobs, the average weekly wage increased from eighteen dollars to thirty-three dollars.


TABLE III

PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS OF 1000 TEXAS NEGRO FAMILIES ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF HOURS WORKED DAILY

WORK HOURS PER DAY		LAST JOB BEFORE 1941	PRESENT JOB
Under	5.....	6.6	6.2
	6.....	6.8	5.5
	7.....	5.8	4.4
	8.....	44.1	56.3
	9.....	10.8	11.2
	10.....	12.5	10.1
	11.....	2.6	1.9
	12.....	8.7	3.1
13 and over	2.1	1.3
TOTAL.....		100.0	100.0

Changes in occupational emphasis of these family members have meant not only an increase in wage, but they have been accompanied by a constancy in the average number of daily working hours. Family members averaged eight hours per day on their last jobs held before 1941 and on their present jobs. However, there was much more uniformity in the working hours of the present jobs. Whereas 36.7 per cent of the workers put in over eight hours per day on their last jobs held before 1941, only 27.6 per cent of them worked over eight hours per day on their present jobs. These facts are shown by Table III.

CHART IV



PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF 673 TEXAS NEGRO FAMILIES
 ACCORDING TO MONTHLY RENTAL RATES PAID
 BEFORE 1941 AND PRESENT

Adjustment to a new type of job with its higher wage also means adjustment to a new type of family consumption and its higher cost of living. The tenancy rate of these families was 67.3. Therefore the factor of rent was very important in their economic organization. Chart IV shows that the average weekly rental rate changed from sixteen dollars before 1941 to nineteen dollars at the time of the investigation. However, these averages do not tell the complete story. In both periods rental rates ranged from two dollars to forty-four dollars per month. However, whereas only 28.9 per cent of the renter families paid over nineteen dollars per month before 1941, 42.4 per cent of them paid over this amount after 1941.

TABLE IV

COST OF LIVING INDEXES FOR LARGE CITIES, 1943
(1935-39 . . . 100)


BUDGETARY ITEMS	AVERAGE FOR LARGE CITIES	HOUSTON
All	124.1	123.0
Food	137.3	136.9
Clothing	133.0	134.6
Fuel, electricity, etc.	108.0	90.0
House furnishing	126.5	123.2
Miscellaneous	115.7	118.6

All families of the nation have found it necessary to adjust to a higher cost of living. Between 1939 and 1943 the cost of living index for large American cities increased from 99.4 to 124.1. It should be noticed that these indexes are based on the cost of goods purchased by wage earners and lower salaried workers. Table IV shows that Houston, on the whole has a cost of living index slightly lower than other American cities. However, the index is higher for clothing.⁴

Since it was expected that the wages of the families had increased, there was interest in seeing the extent to which they had experienced an increase in their expenditures since the 1941 period. When this type of analysis was made, we were in a position to see more clearly the influence of the family's new type of living on its standard of living. Although there was an increase of expenditure represented in all budgetary items as the family passed from the three year period preceding 1941 to the three year period immediately following, there were great differences in the per cent of increase for the various budgetary items as reported by the families. Chart V shows the per cent of increase of main budgetary items. From the facts presented, we may conclude that clothing, food, health, and educational costs accounted for most of the increase in cost of living experienced by these families. Case materials revealed that these increases were not due to the rising cost of living of this period as much as to the rising standard of living of the Negro population resulting from the degree of urbanization and industrialization incidental to the emergency of war.

⁴ *Monthly Labor Review*, January 1944, pp. 186-193.

CHART V



AVERAGE PER CENT INCREASE IN EXPENDITURES FOR SPECIFIC
BUDGETARY ITEMS AS EXPERIENCED BY 1000 TEXAS
NEGRO FAMILIES SINCE 1941

Since families reported very little difference in the amount of food consumed before 1941 and since that year, there is evidence that this increase of food expenditure is in response to the higher cost of living. However, since the family income has appreciably increased, many dental maladies were corrected by family members, and physicians were consulted in cases that were given treatment by cheap patent medicines only prior to 1941. Because the money was available, many clothing ambitions were satisfied, and the sons and daughters of many of these families found their way to colleges. Some of these expenditures would be defined by our general society as very wise, whereas some others that were made would be defined as a spend-thrift mania in an El Dorado atmosphere. We draw this latter conclusion not only because of the types of consumer goods for which great expenditures were made, but because of the amount of the family income saved. Over two thirds of these families experienced an increase in family income,

but only 46.0 per cent of those experiencing such increase saved a proportion of their income greater than that saved before its increase.

RELATION OF FAMILY READJUSTMENT AND MINORITY GROUP STATUS

Technically, we may say that the emergency of war has encouraged the shift of these Negro families from the point of view of spatial, sustenance, and social position. However, this would mean merely that we have seen many of these families shift from small towns and rural areas to large cities. We have seen their members shift from their traditional occupational roles as farmers and domestic servants to a new role as a mass of factory workers. However, accompanying these changes in habitation and economic role has been a change in psychology reflected not only in their reactions to situations of interracial contact, but also reflected in the things for which they spend their money. Facts of this research indicate, first, that these changes are considered desirable by the members of these Negro families, and second, that because of their desirability, these families will seek to hold in the world of peace this position they have gained in the world of war.

Therefore, we were interested in observing the extent to which white citizens of the areas in which these families live are willing to tolerate the maintenance of this newly gained position, and the extent to which they differ from Negroes in this regard. To make this observation, racial attitude questionnaires were given, under the direction of Professors of Social Science, to 342 white college students and an equal number of Negro college students. Both student groups were composed wholly of sons and daughters of citizens of Texas, and were considered fairly representative of the leaders of our post war era.*

* The identity of the white and Negro colleges whose students participated in the study is concealed for purposes of guaranteeing anonymity.

TABLE V

**ATTITUDE RESPONSES OF WHITE AND NEGRO COLLEGE
STUDENTS TOWARD INTERRACIAL ASPECT OF
ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

ITEMS	WHITE RESPONSE				NEGRO RESPONSE			
	All	Most	Few	No	All	Most	Few	No
Negroes Should be prohibited from employment at places where they must work with whites	5.2	14.1	30.5	50.1	1.7	.8	16.1	81.4
Negroes should be paid salaries equal to whites where qualifications and type of work are the same.....	55.0	23.3	16.7	5.0	86.5	7.6	1.7	4.2
Labor unions of the south are justified in excluding Negro workers from membership	12.2	14.8	32.0	41.0	4.3	11.2	13.8	70.7
Skilled Negro workers should be given recognition and just classification by labor unions	56.1	25.2	13.0	5.7	89.9	6.7	.9	2.5
Whites should expect Negroes to spend their money with them if these Negroes earn their money by working for them	9.5	8.6	16.4	65.5	4.2	5.9	25.2	64.7

When these college students were given an opportunity to register their degree of willingness to generalize on issues involving the inter-racial aspect of economic relations, they registered definite attitudes by circling the word "all", "most", "few", or "no" before statements on the questionnaire form. Table V is a tabulation of their responses to some of the items included, and presents data that allow us to draw several definite conclusions. There is evidence that the economic inter-dependence of whites and Negroes enhanced by the emergency of war would be tolerated by the majority of the white students tested, and that Negro students would differ with them only in size of majority opinion.

Over half of the white college students would prohibit no Negroes from employment at places where they must work with whites. Over half of them would pay these Negro workers a

salary equal to that paid white workers with equal qualifications and type of work, and almost two thirds of them would expect no Negro to spend his money with them if he earns it by working for them. However, less than a majority of them believed that no labor union of the south is justified in excluding Negro workers from membership. Most were willing to classify and recognize skilled Negro workers, but they would place these workers in a separate union.

TABLE VI

ATTITUDE RESPONSES OF WHITE AND NEGRO COLLEGE
STUDENTS TOWARD RACIAL SEGREGATION

ITEMS	WHITE RESPONSE				NEGRO RESPONSE			
	All	Most	Few	No	All	Most	Few	No
Whites and Negroes should be segregated from each other.....	57.8	32.2	6.3	3.7	5.2	5.2	17.2	72.4
Negroes should be placed in restricted residential areas of American towns	53.2	23.4	8.1	15.3	2.6	1.7	19.8	75.9
Negroes should yield their seats to whites on public conveyances as long as there are whites standing and Negroes sitting	23.6	13.7	11.6	51.1	.9	.9	1.7	96.5
White people should be prohibited from maintaining friendly courteous relations with Negroes	2.7	8.0	9.7	79.6	.9	2.5	2.5	94.1
Adult Negroes should be referred to by whites as "Miss", "Mrs" or "Mr."	9.4	13.7	23.1	53.8	83.2	9.2	3.4	4.2
Negroes have rights which whites are morally bound to respect	55.6	21.4	18.8	4.2	43.0	23.7	29.8	3.5

The attitudes of white college students toward the established policies of racial segregation in American society were more traditional than were their attitudes toward the inter-racial aspects of economic relations. Table VI shows that as the shift of the Negro's position in American society brings him in closer contact with American whites, these students wish to see the specific marks that socially separate the two races maintained. Over half of them believed that all whites and Negroes should be separated from each other, and over half of them believed that Negroes

should be placed in restricted residential areas of American towns. Over half of them believed that no adult Negro should be referred to by whites as "Miss", "Mrs." or "Mr." Because from the point of view of the Negro student these beliefs are a disadvantage, it is natural that there was great disagreement between the two groups. However, the majority of the white students believed that no Negro should yield his seat to whites on public conveyances as long as there are whites standing and Negroes sitting. Almost four fifths of the white students believed that no white person should be prohibited from maintaining friendly courteous relations with Negroes, and over half of them believed that all Negroes have rights which whites are morally bound to respect. On these issues there was much less disagreement between whites and Negroes.

If these findings of racial attitudes are indicative of the trend of the interracial psychology of the next generation, there is evidence that the new role into which Negro workers and family members have been catapulted by the present emergency of war will be tolerated by Texas whites, and will result in a minimum amount of racial friction.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The data presented in this report demonstrated that under the influence of war American families come into existence more rapidly and become dissolved more rapidly than in peace time. They show that a sample of Texas Negro families is no exception to this principle.

2. The influence of war upon family mobility is shown by the fact that families had an abnormally high rate of mobility during the three year period immediately following 1941, and their reasons for moving were based upon attempted adjustment to the labor demands of our war economy.

3. Responding to the expanded labor demand in specific industries, members of these families shifted from a group of agri-

cultural and domestic service workers to a mass of factory labor. Although this shift intensified racial friction, it resulted in a change of the position of these families and the establishment of a new pattern of life which they defined as better than the old.

4. The attitudes of white and Negro college students revealed a willingness of whites to tolerate this change in economic status as long as the traditional social relations of the races are maintained. However, the reliability of these attitude rates is lessened by the fact that the students represent a select element of our society, and the social attitude is not an exact index of overt behavior.

National Party Conventions: Canada

Shows the Way

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For the dramatic and the spectacular in politics perhaps nothing can rival the assembly of the party stalwarts in national party convention. In presidential election years the national conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties become the focus of all eyes. There is so much blare and fanfare in connection with our mammoth presidential nomination assemblies that we are accustomed to think that they have no counterpart anywhere else in the world. But national party conventions to select party leaders and to formulate party platforms are not especially peculiar to the United States or, as sometimes assumed, to the presidential form of government. Our Canadian neighbors, in particular, have in the past twenty-five years adopted and refined the national convention as a party institution and shown its latent possibilities.

Not so long ago, in the midst of war, the Conservative party in Canada held a great national convention. At this convention a new national leader was chosen, the party's platform was brought up to date and oriented in a new direction, and plans were laid for revitalization of the party's professional organization throughout the country.¹ Using this convention as typical of Canadian party practice, and referring to other Canadian national major-party conventions when appropriate, let us see what Canadian experience reveals.

At the outset it should be noted that party conventions in Canada are not held every four years, or at any other regular interval, as are party conventions in the United States. Their prime reason for assembling is to select a new party leader, and

¹ At the convention, held December 9, 10, and 11, 1942, the party also changed its name to Progressive Conservative party. This is only the latest of a fairly lengthy list of names under which it has appealed to the electorate. For purposes of simplicity, we shall use the name Conservative party.

under the parliamentary system, the issue of leadership arises at odd, not at regular, intervals.

At one time the parliamentary group in Canada had complete say over the question of national leadership. When a vacancy occurred, they would meet in caucus to select the new leader or to advise a retiring leader on the matter of selection of his successor. During the past twenty-five years control over selection of the national leader has passed from the parliamentary group proper to the more broadly representative national party convention.² The Liberals inaugurated this practice with their convention to select Laurier's successor in 1919 and the Conservatives followed suit in 1927, 1938, and 1942. Today, when the leadership becomes vacant and the party is out of power, the caucus merely selects a "temporary" leader to serve until a national convention can meet to select a "permanent" leader.

Thus the grass roots element of the party has secured an important place in the selection of the leader. That this transfer of control has been significant is clear when one realizes that three out of four national party leaders chosen at party conventions were not members of the federal parliament at the time of their selection.³ The parliamentary caucus was not thus inclined to look outside its own membership for leadership. Moreover, on the two occasions when the "temporary" leaders selected by the party caucus entered the convention contests, they were defeated.

What led the Conservatives to call this recent convention and under what political circumstances did the party meet? It is necessary to emphasize that ever since World War I the Conservative party has been in difficulty. Up to that time Canada operated under a typical two-party system, with Liberals and

² If the party leadership were to become vacant while the party was in power, the parliamentary group might be expected to reassert itself by picking a successor to become prime minister—there being no time to hold a convention. A subsequently held convention, if called, could do little more than ratify the choice.

³ Mackenzie King, selected by the Liberals in 1919, and Robert J. Manion, selected by the Conservatives in 1938, although not currently members of parliament, had held seats in the past. John Bracken, selected by the Conservatives in 1942, had never held a seat in the federal parliament.

Conservatives alternating in power. Since that time, the Liberals under Mackenzie King have been in power most of the time. The Conservatives were overwhelmingly defeated in the last two general elections. Of the total of 245 seats in the dominion House of Commons, they secured only 39 seats to 171 seats for the Liberals in 1935, and only 39 seats to 178 for the Liberals in 1940.

Besides, the Conservatives in the last twenty-five years felt on their necks the hot breath of a strong third party movement. The Progressive party in the twenties, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation party since 1932, were a constant threat. Many former Conservatives undoubtedly joined the ranks of the Liberals in recent years in order to avoid splitting the "conservative" voting public to the advantage of the rising socialist third party movement.

Likewise, on the provincial level the Conservatives had seemingly lost their touch. At the time the convention met, there was not one provincial Conservative government. Even the historic Tory stronghold of Ontario had turned renegade and joined the Liberal cause. Provincial Conservative party organization, so important to national party success, had largely collapsed.

After the party defeat at the general election of 1940, Robert J. Manion, selected as party leader at the 1938 national convention, offered his resignation. The parliamentary caucus accepted it, and chose R. B. Hanson as temporary leader to serve until a national convention could be held, probably in the summer of 1942.

In November, 1941, an assembly of about 200 stalwarts, representing the federal and provincial legislative groups and provincial party associations met at Ottawa ostensibly to plan for the forthcoming convention. Something went wrong, and the group was somehow prevailed upon to recall Arthur Meighen, former leader and Conservative prime minister, from his seat in the Senate to take over the permanent leadership. The constitutionality of this move, from the viewpoint of party practice, was very doubtful.

But the fact that the country was engaged in a struggle for its very existence, a condition in which politics as usual might have had repercussions upon public opinion, enabled supporters of Meighen to convince the assembly to short-circuit the convention process. Mr. Meighen's subsequent defeat in the by-election in February, 1942, in which he sought to gain entry to the House of Commons, rendered this whole episode a fiasco.

Stunned and groggy from these successive misfortunes, capped by Meighen's defeat in the February by-election, it appeared that the Conservative party was really in its death throes. Many were the newspaper editorials and public speeches on this theme. But major parties do not die easily despite the temerity of those who are always pronouncing funeral orations over their supposedly lifeless corpses.

In September, 1942, at Port Hope, Ontario, a group of nearly 200 Conservative laymen met to draft a liberal statement of aims and beliefs with the thought that the impetus thus engendered would carry over to a convention which they expected or hoped would be called in the near future. Members of the federal and provincial legislative bodies and professional party leaders were not invited. This more or less spontaneous get-together of the rank and file was important in smoothing the way for the subsequent party convention. Indeed the resiliency and boldness of the rank and file exceeded that of their professional leaders. As a leading Canadian journalist reported, "The Conference recorded the first definite signs of health, of lusty life, in the Conservative party since the disaster of 1935."⁴

About two weeks later Mr. Meighen announced that a national convention would be held. A national convention committee was shortly formed to proceed to organize the convention. This committee consisted of 46 members, including key federal and provincial legislative figures, and a particular effort was made to secure representation from provincial party organizations. Federalism leads to a bifurcated party organization, with frequent

⁴ Grant Dexter in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 September, 1942, p. 11.

cleavages between the national and provincial groupings. Yet national party success depends upon substantial support by provincial political organizations. Hence, great pains are always taken to give broad provincial representation in the making of national preconvention decisions.

The national convention committee met at Ottawa on October 6th and made important broad decisions, leaving details to be worked out by an executive committee. The broad questions settled by the committee as a whole involved setting a time and selecting a place for the convention and deciding upon the basis for representation at the convention.

Winnipeg was selected as the site for the convention without difficulty. Ottawa was out of the question as the convention city because of its overcrowded condition as the war-time capital of Canada. Toronto and Montreal, seemingly logical choices because of adequate hotel facilities, are ruled out in Canadian politics largely because of the Toronto Tory and Montreal French differences. No major party so far has felt it expedient to hold a convention in either the Montreal or Toronto strongholds for fear of aggravating or of emphasizing racial differences. Winnipeg was the only feasible place left, and its selection had the additional advantage of perhaps helping the Conservatives to win back some of the lost prairie farm vote.

The basis for representation at Canadian party conventions is quite different from American practice and the convention committee's conclusions in this regard justify special attention. Three classes of delegates were accredited to the convention: delegates ex-officio, delegates-at-large, and riding delegates.⁵

As delegates ex-officio, the following were entitled to attend with full rights to vote and participate in convention proceedings: (a) all Conservative privy councillors who supported the federal

⁵ This data on the basis for representation at the convention comes from a mimeographed release, "Memorandum No. 8, Classes of Delegates to be Accredited at the National Conservative Convention" issued by the National Convention Committee on 9 October, 1942. See also the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 October, 1942, pp. 1, 9.

Conservative party, (b) all Conservative senators, (c) all Conservative members of the House of Commons, (d) provincial legislators and legislative councillors who supported the Conservative party federally, (e) all provincial Conservative party leaders, and (f) all members of the national convention committee and chairmen of the sub-committees of the national convention committee.

As delegates-at-large, the national convention committee authorized selection (a) by provincial party associations of as many delegates as the province had federal electoral districts, "such delegates to be selected *not by districts* but *province-wide* to represent the leading activities, educational, press, labour, agriculture, professions, business, and so forth" and (b) by Young Conservative associations of special youth delegates-at-large on a basis of nine for Ontario and Quebec (of whom at least four should be young women) and three from the other provinces (of whom at least one should be a young woman).

Finally, as riding delegates, there were to be three official delegates and three alternate delegates from each federal constituency. It was contemplated that the riding delegates should constitute the democratic backbone of the convention and should be chosen at meetings of Conservative federal riding associations held throughout the country. Much of the time of the national headquarters prior to the convention was spent in communicating with constituency associations, prodding them into delegate-selecting activity.

It can be seen from these provisions for representation that a large convention was planned—roughly 1200 voting delegates. The number of authorized full voting delegates at Canadian party conventions has normally been larger than the number authorized at American conventions.⁶ While the total possible number did not attend the Winnipeg convention, it is significant

⁶ The number of actual delegates at American party conventions is often greater because of the objectionable practice in some states, notably Texas, of dividing a single vote among two or more delegates. This leads to weird fractional divisions and considerable delay in voting. This practice has no counterpart in Canada.

that in the midst of war and with party fortunes at their lowest ebb in history, more than 900 voting delegates participated—many having traveled more than a thousand miles to the convention city. Surely this is a tribute to the vitality of the Canadian party system and to the national convention as a party institution.⁷

The provision for delegates ex-officio, a typical Canadian party practice, insures that a large group of federal and provincial legislators and professional party bigwigs will be in attendance to prevent the grass roots delegates from running away with the show. In practice, these ex-officio delegates have been a stabilizing influence, but despite their political experience they have in no way coerced the rank and file as reflected through riding delegates elected by party laymen from each constituency. Since Canada has no counterpart to our presidential primary, and since there are no intermediate provincial conventions to pick the delegates to the national convention as a counterpart to our state conventions, the delegates commonly arrive at the convention with fairly open minds and uninstructed on the leadership issue. Under these circumstances, recency of election as a delegate is immaterial, and the presence of ex-officio delegates is of no great concern. What is desired is a representative cross-section of the party, and to achieve this end, the representative base is admirably adapted.

The system of selecting delegates at large provides a sort of functional representation of important interest groups, insuring that the convention shall rest on a broader basis than artificial geographical constituencies. Recognizing the need for a constant stream of new adherents to replace the oldsters, special representation at large is recognized for youth. These features of

⁷ Consider also the fact that the Mother of Parliaments, that of the United Kingdom, was elected in November, 1935, for a five-year term, but has since prolonged its life and that the major parties represented in the British House of Commons have declared a political truce. Parties in Canada have not used the war as an excuse for postponing federal general elections or the party battle. Of course, occasional voices have advocated collaboration between the parties or "National Government."

Canadian convention practice would seem commendable.

When the delegates arrived at Winnipeg for the convention, they found all details had been organized with meticulous care. The convention was to meet for three days, with morning and afternoon sessions the first and third days, and morning, afternoon, and evening sessions on the second day. Working through special subcommittees on local arrangements, transportation, resolutions and policy, and party organization, the national convention committee had seemingly overlooked no point essential to the efficient dispatch of convention business and the comfort of those in attendance.

In physical appearance North American party conventions are much the same everywhere. The meeting hall at Winnipeg was draped with flags and bunting. Reserved sections for delegations were appropriately marked for the various provinces. The public crowded in the galleries to see the spectacle. Off in the corner a band played, while delegates milled about the floor, shaking hands, renewing old acquaintances, and passed along the latest gossip as to pending events in the contest for leadership.

Conventions are dramatic and have news value. Leading reporters from all over Canada were present to record the events, the whisperings, the trends, the ever-changing tempo. The news wires out of Winnipeg were hot with the latest "dope." But one medium of publicity was conspicuous by its absence. No radio microphone graced the platform. Canadian listeners did not have to hear the party orators replace their favorite programs. On the other hand, many might have preferred such a temporary replacement. Much of what goes on at party conventions has real educational value, and one cannot avoid the feeling that a policy which excludes its dissemination by radio represents a great loss. In his farewell address as party leader, Mr. Meighen bitterly assailed the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for its denial of the party's request for radio time. "How different this attitude is to the action of the great, privately-owned networks in the United States, which allowed both parties the use of their entire

networks a few months ago," he vigorously lamented.⁸

Convention organization for business was interesting, an attempt being made to reflect federal and racial differences. Committees were set up, with members selected to represent provincial delegations. The officers of the convention included joint chairmen, one English-speaking, the other French-speaking, to reflect the two dominant racial strains, with a vice-chairman from each province to reflect federalism. Likewise, an English-speaking and French-speaking secretary were selected.

In any analysis of Canadian convention practice two features deserve special attention—the procedure for preparing the party platform and the procedure for nominating and voting for party leader. Other features will be ignored so as to allow for more ample discussion of these two main convention tasks.

The Conservatives did not leave the job of preparing the party platform until the time the convention should meet at Winnipeg. That would have involved confusion, disagreement, and faulty expression. The resolutions adopted by the convention represented the considered conclusions of the party membership, arrived at after months of study, during which every effort was made to encourage suggestions from the rank and file in the constituencies. American parties have seldom given such careful pre-convention consideration to their platforms.

The Port Hope conference with its statement of aims and beliefs furnished a platform to shoot at—a center for Conservative thinking. While it is our purpose to consider procedure in adopting, rather than the substance of, the platform, it is important to note that the Port Hope resolutions were outside the orbit of the traditional Conservative policy. The confusion created by this very fact helped to bring about the convention. The party's

⁸ See *Winnipeg Free Press*, 9 December, 1942, p. 1. In fairness, it should be mentioned that the policy of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation under which convention broadcasts are prohibited had received the tacit approval of all political parties, including the Conservative party, prior to official promulgation by the Corporation. Mr. Meighen's blast, while probably sound on the merits, came with perhaps poor taste after this prior Conservative approval.

historic mouthpiece, *The Gazette of Montreal*, commenting on the Port Hope resolutions, asked the rhetorical question, "Are these Conservative principles?" and answered:

"Up to the present they have not been so. If they are to be so in the future, it would be well to have the decision made by a body more regularly selected than this self-admittedly unofficial 'round table conference.' It is said a number of Port Hope delegates want a Conservative National Convention in the fairly near future. If that be the case, they have managed to create a good argument in favor of their heart's desire—namely, that only a National Convention can now clarify and authoritatively define the Conservative party's attitude on national questions."⁹

As soon as the national convention committee had been set up, it appointed a pre-convention resolutions and policy committee to "study, prior to the Convention, all questions relating to party policy, and its conclusions will be available to the Resolutions and Policy Committee at the Convention, and we hope will greatly assist that Committee in its work." Constituency associations were urged to form study groups and "formulate suggestions expressing the viewpoint of the people in your riding,"¹⁰ the same to be forwarded immediately to the national headquarters for study.

The pre-convention resolutions and policy committee pursued its task through six subcommittees: war policy, war veterans, agriculture, labour relations, reconstruction, development of national resources. As the convention drew near the national convention committee decided to formalize the position of the pre-convention group studying party policies.¹¹ The pre-convention committee was expanded to include 167 members apportioned according to provincial representation in the House of Commons. This body was summoned to appear at Winnipeg two days prior

⁹ *Montreal Gazette*, 8 September, 1942, p. 8.

¹⁰ The quotations in this paragraph are from a mimeographed letter dated October 9, 1942, sent out from national convention headquarters to party organizations and leaders in the field.

¹¹ In a Memorandum to the Members of the National Conservative Convention Committee, the Executive Committee reported on November 19, 1942: "It is recognized that the formulation of party policy cannot be left to the haphazard consideration which might be awarded to it by a Resolutions Committee during the three hectic days of the Convention. Those days do not constitute an ideal occasion for the calm, deliberate consideration of policy."

to opening of the convention with the thought that it could then complete its study, and with the hope "that when the Convention itself meets, the activities of the Pre-Convention committee . . . and those of the Resolutions and Policy Committee at the Convention itself may be fully integrated."¹² Since a large proportion of those who were attendant as members of the pre-convention committee were also delegates to the convention, the integration was most complete, and the official resolutions and policy committee of the convention, constituted on a similar representative basis, was dominated by the pre-convention group.

One must not jump to the conclusion that the delegates on arrival found the platform a *fait accompli*. The party's procedure for its consideration by the convention itself was noteworthy and typical of Canadian party practice. Working within those limitations upon individual participation and expression which are necessarily associated with deliberations of any large body, opportunity was given for a maximum of rank and file influence.

As we have seen, this was accomplished partly by bringing into the study and preparation stage, prior to submission to the convention, a committee hardly less representative than the convention itself, which committee encouraged suggestions from constituency groups. But perhaps of equal significance was the submission of the platform to the convention in the form of separate policy resolutions. Unlike American practice, where the platform is commonly submitted *in toto* and, under pressure of time, disposed of with almost no discussion except eulogy,¹³ separate resolutions were brought up for deliberation by the Conservatives at morning and afternoon sessions on the second day of the convention. Although nominations of candidates for leader took the spotlight at the evening session of the second day, the following morning's session was devoted to further discussion of policy resolutions. In fact, some past party conventions have

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Compare the adoption of the party platform by the Republicans at their convention in Philadelphia in 1940. See *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Republican National Convention* (Washington, D. C.: Judd and Detweiler, Inc., n.d. [1940]), 139ff.

continued to discuss platform resolutions even between ballots for leader, during the final session. It would seem that Canadian party procedure for preparing the party platform is admirably designed to overcome at least part of the "steam rolling" to which the convention process is so conducive.

Let us now examine the procedure at the convention for selecting the party leader. Here Canadian party practice is most distinguishable from our own, and favorably so. While it would be wrong to say that in Canada the office seeks the man and the man never seeks the office, at the Winnipeg convention, as at previous Canadian conventions, there were no elaborate candidates' headquarters with swing bands and bebies of pretty girls. Unofficial managers for the various aspirants for the leadership were active in lining up votes prior to the convention and did considerable button-holing of delegates on their arrival at Winnipeg. While it is true that a high-up group of "inner circle" leaders were fostering the candidacy of John Bracken, Manitoba's Liberal Progressive premier, Mr. Bracken ultimately triumphed in the balloting in spite of their support, rather than because of it. There may have been a junta to throw the convention to Bracken, but the convention repudiated the junta after restively observing its secret machinations and may be truly described as independently choosing its new leader.¹⁴

"Staged" and almost hysterical demonstrations on behalf of candidates for party nomination for the presidency are a frequent characteristic of American convention practice. The galleries are packed with partisans, armed with banners, noise-makers, and a plan of action for the moment when the magic name of the candidate shall be breathed into the amplifying system. Not so Canadian practice.

The Winnipeg convention, following the lead of its Conservative predecessors, provided for nomination of candidates in writing

¹⁴ See "Without Bracken They Had Nothing" by B. K. Sandwell in the *Toronto Saturday Night* 26, December, 1942, p. 14; compare "There was a Junta," in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 December, 1942, p. 11

and for voting for leader by secret ballot in which the personal independence of each delegate could be, if he so desired, preserved. There was no dramatic call of the provinces, with Alberta, first on the list, yielding to Manitoba, to nominate a favorite son. Instead, the rules provided that nomination papers, signed by a mover and a seconder, with a signed acceptance by the candidate, should be handed to the chairman of the committee on nominations prior to eight o'clock in the evening of the second day of the convention.

The names of the candidates thus nominated were officially announced to the assembled delegates at the opening of the session. Movers and seconders were allowed ten minutes each to speak on behalf of their candidates, the order in which the nominations were thus supported being determined by lot. Following these speeches in support, each candidate was then given twenty minutes to address the convention in person. With five candidates nominated at the Winnipeg convention the delegates put in a long and strenuous evening of listening to speeches.

The main objection to this procedure for nominating candidates rests on the length of the session. At the Winnipeg convention, for example, had full advantage been taken of the allotment of time under the rules, speeches would have totalled three hours and twenty minutes for the five candidates, not to mention further diversion provided by the chairman of the evening. It is no wonder that the delegates show impatience and become restless before the oratory is over. In order to avoid this undue strain on delegates' tempers, perhaps the nominations could be spread over two sessions of the convention. Or maybe the candidate's speech could be reduced in length and only one speech instead of the present two be allowed in his support.

The requirement of a written nomination paper, the reduction of the speeches by supporters to two, and the public appearance before the convention of the candidate himself formalizes the nomination procedure and provides it with an atmosphere of dignity and deliberation almost totally lacking in American party

conventions. Nor has this result been obtained at the expense of the dramatic. At the Winnipeg convention there was an air of tenseness and expectancy as the hour of eight o'clock drew near; and the last second filing of the nomination paper of Mr. Bracken for the leadership kept everyone in suspense.

There is a great deal to be said for the personal appearance of the candidates before the assembled delegates.¹⁵ The American custom, often violated, to be sure, which keeps the candidate under wraps at his home, or no closer than his hotel suite, not only runs up telephone tolls, but debars most of the delegates from seeing and estimating his qualities until after the voting has taken place. The absence in Canada of intermediate provincial conventions or of devices such as presidential preferential primaries to sift out potential leadership candidates means that many delegates arrive at the convention relatively uncommitted and uninformed, as compared with delegates to American conventions. This fact reinforces the need for formalization of the candidates' appearance before the delegates at the convention.

On the morning after the nominations, the books of ballots to be used in voting for leader were distributed to individual delegates. Every insurance was taken to see that only proper persons received ballot books. Balloting for leader was scheduled for the afternoon session. The rules provided that the candidate who should first receive 50 per cent of the votes on any ballot should be declared elected. They also permitted any candidate to resign from the balloting after the first ballot. Votes for candidates were to be announced after each balloting except the final one which should complete the choice of a leader. The members of the convention committee on nominations were to serve as scrutineers and each candidate was given the opportunity to appoint a representative to observe the counting. No safeguard was over-

¹⁵ The Conservative party has always provided a special time for speeches and personal appearance by the candidates for the leadership. The Liberals at their convention in 1919 did not set aside such a time, but each candidate found a time and did speak informally in connection with the discussion of the policy resolutions.

looked to insure that only qualified delegates should vote and that their votes should be honestly counted.

An air of tenseness pervaded the auditorium in the afternoon as the delegates filed in for the last session—the one which should determine upon the new party leader. A few laggards picked up books of ballots which they had neglected to secure in the morning. Then balloting began. The collection of ballot boxes and the counting of the ballots proceeded slowly, and it was some time before the chair announced the vote as 420 for Bracken, 222 for MacPherson, 120 for Diefenbaker, 88 for Green, and 20 for Stevens. John Bracken was sixteen votes short of a clear majority on the first ballot. A second ballot was called for, with three candidates in the race, Green and Stevens having voluntarily dropped out. On the second balloting, Bracken was announced as the victor with an unofficial vote of 538 to 255 for MacPherson and 79 for Diefenbaker. The vote, on motion of the defeated candidates, was then made unanimous, and the new leader closed the convention with an address.

American convention practice in voting for the party candidate for the presidency has often been assailed. It is claimed that a substantial number of the delegates too frequently have forfeited all right to respect by a sheeplike following of a boss' lead. Even though Republican and Democratic parties have both abandoned "unit rule" (whereby the vote of the entire state delegation is cast for a single candidate) as a convention rule, many state delegations at the conventions have continued to follow the rule as a custom.

If independence and individual judgment are criteria of the ideal convention delegate, as so many critics presume, if the delegate is to avoid being a pawn, surely the secret ballot would be a minimum prerequisite. Canadian parties have recognized this and have given the delegate a chance to be independent if he so desires. The Canadian delegate is no automaton coerced

by provincial unit rule.¹⁶ No boss in secret conference in the proverbial smoke-filled hotel room can deliver his vote. No lengthy roll call of the vote of the provinces offers an opportunity to change his mind and his original intended vote, influenced by the desire to jump on the winning band wagon. We have no intention of holding up the Canadian delegate as a paragon of virtue, but at least his failure to achieve the heights demanded by the idealist is due to his own limitations. Convention procedures are peculiarly adapted to insure free self-expression.

In contrast to national conventions in the United States there appears to be a temper at Canadian conventions which frowns upon non-rational appeals and artificial delegate responses. Canadian convention procedure in connection with formulating the platform and voting for the party leader is designed to tap the democratic values and at the same time avoid the irrational, emotional aberrations often associated with the convention process in this country. While we have raised the convention to the pinnacle as a party institution, our experience has rather revealed its defects than developed its latent possibilities. Our Canadian neighbors have clearly shown the way.

¹⁶ Of course there are powerful influences which motivate delegates from a particular province to stick together. Issues before the convention are frequently discussed by special provincial caucuses held when the main convention is not in session. The psychology of sticking with the gang, the political and economic unity of view within the province which is the very justification of federalism as a form of government, are factors making for a common front by the provincial delegation. But the delegate's choice to stick with the gang, or to go his independent way, is nevertheless his own, untrammelled by fear of being found out and consequently ostracized.

Planned War: Confused Peace

T. SWANN HARDING

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In October 1942 the appropriate branch of Government announced that cutting carrot tops to a length of four inches saves forty per cent in shipping space and has no adverse effect on the keeping quality of these lugubrious vegetables. Now that lumber, nails, and other crating materials must be saved and transportation space conserved, that extra carrot top assumes importance. Official U. S. standards have at last been set up for topped carrots.

Long tops are not confined to carrots. For years many vegetables have been shipped to wholesale and retail markets adorned with absolutely useless but very bulky tops. Furthermore, we have carefully processed, packed, and shipped billions of gallons of water in many foods that could have been wholly or partially dehydrated, as they are being in wartime. We did not do these things because we do not plan at peace. We adopt collectivist planning only when at war.

For years we have talked about our overmanned distribution system. This has been called "The Distribution Age" and, capitalism being what it was, it has perhaps been economically fortunate that we could distribute a good deal of income for the unnecessary services of people active in such work. Yet costs of distribution have rather generally exceeded those of production. But in wartime we can afford no such extravagance. It is now announced that a million of the six million men normally engaged in distribution can readily be squeezed out to assume other activities in basic industry.

Excess capacity and nonessential services must also go out of the retail trade, just as nutritionally superfluous crops like melons and celery should not be raised on our farms during war. Labor will be eliminated by abolishing other frills—special deliveries from stores, excessive telephone service, extension of long-

term credit, the privilege of freely returning merchandise. But because our people have never planned scientifically at peace they do not know how to do so at war and must learn in pain.

When canners were told they could not have tin to cover baked beans they went off and said: "Oh, that's all right; we'll use bottles." They never stopped to think that bottle caps and their rubber gaskets also got them over into the field of scarcity. Distributors have been surprised at the extent to which manufacturers produced items from noncritical materials to replace those on which there were priorities. But growing shortages of lumber and wood-pulp will change all that. No material is really noncritical in total war. Lumber, paper, glass, plastics, are all in line for restricted use. Already a thousand items formerly made of iron and steel have been discontinued or threatened with discontinuation. Manufacturers must either get into production of essential civilian goods or of war goods, or get out of business. Though the rational application of technology makes scientific planning absolutely essential we have waited till war forced us to recognize this truth.

Our industrial civilization has so far depended on the economic driving force of so-called free individual enterprise. Socially it has depended on self-help eked out with charity from an upper class acting on the principle of *noblesse oblige*. Politically it has been buttressed on a large number of civic rights and a small number of civic duties, resting largely on tradition and a backward-looking, inflexible legal structure, based in turn largely upon property and fiercely resisting change.

The end product of this has been a fairly rapid expansion of wealth, though one with tremendous fluctuations between different periods and different geographical, occupational, and income groups. Secondly, there has been a great development of voluntary and, later, public social services with a bias towards salvage and piecemeal palliatives, rather than towards the constructive and preventive planning of social security for all. Lastly, there has been a remarkable growth of personal freedom, but a lack of

social discipline, a widening gulf between law and reality, and a type of society than can only be called irresponsible has resulted.

What are the remedies? First, economic planning to iron out the fluctuations and ensure a steady growth and even distribution of the national income. Second, planned social security to provide a higher level of higher-type social services for all, to contract the expanding numbers of the "underprivileged" caused by our failure to plan industry so as to give full employment. Third, a much wider conception of our duties as citizens—individual, family, neighborhood, and group—reinforced by a flexible, socially minded, forward-looking legal structure.

That, abstractly, is our situation and what planning in peacetime could do to remedy it. Yet "planning" has become a horrid word to those who plan most scrupulously and in minutest detail to exploit society for their own financial benefit. At the same time, however, business and industry have tended to become more and more bureaucratic, while they lost efficiency in social performance.

As long ago as December 1913, the editor of the *Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry*, for instance, observed that plant managers were engaged primarily to produce profits regardless of technological and scientific considerations. Stockholders, he went on, were interested only in profits, not at all in how they were produced. But business and industrial growth had been easy and rapid because of favorable raw-material conditions and the greedy demand for products by an ever-increasing population. Hence the matter of developing efficient technical processes was ignored or retarded for many years.

Money was expended on political lobbying rather than on research until more recent years. Business and plant managers became essentially bureau chiefs, financiers created ever new devices to unify industries and control prices, while technicians and scientists remained hired men, and technology and science were sabotaged. Then finally machine output became so great that it had to be curtailed artificially and the industrial and farm

plants kept permanently short of capacity to prevent wrecking the rickety economic system. This derangement amounted to sabotage of science for price maintenance.

Business management went even further. It required the systematic dislocation of our industrial and economic systems. It demanded monopoly of resources, cross shippings, business secrecy; it provoked labor difficulties and defrauded consumers; it took advantage of Government at peace and at war and then sharply criticized Government bungling. In time the community accustomed itself to getting along with only half what its farm and industrial plants could have produced if unhobbled by business management for price maintenance. Thus the public was maintained in insecurity, undernourishment, and poverty.

By December 1941, the American Institute of Public Opinion could report, as a result of one of its surveys, that families with incomes of \$25 to \$30 a week used 65 percent less milk in their diets than good nutritional standards required. Between June and December 1941, at least six million American families had reduced their dietetic standards in protective foods of the highest value. They knew the requirements of a good diet. They simply could not afford to purchase the food needed.

At the same time the Farm Security Administration released figures on a health survey of about twelve thousand farm people in the low-income group in seventeen States. Only four percent of these people had really good health. Ninety-six percent of them averaged three and one-half defects per person, many of them the result of malnutrition. For only half our farm families have had good diets in recent years. Yet, in December 1941, a group of businessmen and manufacturers, meeting in New York City, denied that the "underprivileged" existed, and said that if we only returned to "thrift, hard work, industry, ambition, and the habit of living within our incomes," everything would be all right.

Naturally a considerable measure of Government planning had to be undertaken to remedy these conditions because private enterprise consistently ignored its social obligations. Advances in

science and technology, increases and shifts in populations, the urbanization of our people, changes in the structure of business and industry, and other such factors necessitated Government interference. But the tendency towards planned, centralized control was not rapid during peace. War, however, tacitly acknowledges the ineptitude and inefficiency of private enterprise and sets up rigid economic planning in its stead.

Immediately it becomes evident that our customary run of manufacturers, industrialists, businessmen, and financiers are inadequately trained to function properly under a fully planned system. A few months ago a partner in a company which specialized in training all types of personnel for supervisory work said that skill in management was deplorably lacking. This held back the all-out productive effort required by total war. The company had as clients some of the Nation's leading business and industrial organizations.

It found that management had assumed a defensive attitude for years. Supervisors lacked courage to initiate new undertakings. Both managers and supervisors awaited the appearance of trouble and the piling up of problems. They did not plan ahead with foresight to prevent trouble before it happened. The skill of lower-bracket employees was vitiated by lack of skill among supervisors and administrators.

When twenty-five plant superintendents were asked to write down their problems on paper for analysis not one had any problems! Instead they were waiting for things to happen, waiting for problems to arise. They could not detect trouble in advance and head it off. They could not plan. They had never had to do that. Just make the overhead large enough and scientific planning can be disregarded.

Meanwhile supervisors and administrations engaged in feverish activity on details. They had no philosophy, no long-range view, no long-time objective, no accepted patterns of thought. Labor troubles occurred usually because management was too unintelligent to understand those managed, their attitudes, their problems.

Many problems were arbitrarily written off as incapable of solution. In other cases it was summarily assumed that solution would be more trouble and expense than the problem. In any case the tendency was to pass problems along higher up to the top executives.

Late in 1942 a representative of the War Manpower Commission was pleading with the National Association of Manufacturers to train bosses. More than a million supervisors would be required for the fifteen million workers ultimately to be engaged in war production. Management can no longer recruit supervisors in the market; it must train them, a job business management has seriously neglected heretofore. Too often supervisory personnel, in a desire to make a good showing or merely to exert authority, made decisions that resulted in widespread discontent.

Once more we have the story of retarded wartime production because our peacetime economic and industrial system was disorderly and unplanned. In consequence it lacked the kind of trained supervisory and administrative personnel a scientifically planned economy, such as we have in total war, absolutely requires. For many years employers and business administrators have worked feverishly from sixty to seventy hours weekly, but not efficiently, not productively. They have been submerged in detail.

In wartime they bring these habits into Government and render it also hesitant, bungling, and inefficient. They are unaware that most of their prolonged activity consists in mere busy work that a competent individual would not have to do at all. Their many telephone lines, buzzers, dictographs, calculating machines, filing cabinets, and secretaries make a satisfying hum of activity, but their accomplishment is meager. Thus the illusion of extreme "busy-ness" is created.

But the tendency is really neurotic. The activity and the long hours in many instances are mere compensation for real or fancied incompetence. Competent individuals perform administrative tasks easily because they readily make decisions, aware that a

quick wrong decision is better than a right decision so delayed it has lost all potency and force. Such persons are not afraid they may stick their necks out.

Viewed broadly this comes down to the difference between intelligently planned activity carried out in accord with rationally evolved basic principles, and prolonged series of individual acts, decisions, and changes in direction which are unrelated to any fundamental conception of trends and long-time objectives—often because none exist. Yet the mere mention of planning arouses latent hostility among such persons. For they are reluctant or incompetent to engage in critical thinking about such matters. We then pay dearly at war for inept failures to plan properly at peace.

Fortunately war rudely breaks in upon business and industrial traditions which retard progress at peace. It breaks the patent system for instance, and puts long-hidden inventions into production. It replaces high-cost, inefficient processes with efficient, low-cost processes long husbanded in secret. Patent pools replace a monopoly on knowledge. Scientific information becomes a public trust and technical knowledge is spread abroad. There are always many technological processes it is eminently worth-while to try out in an economy governed by results rather than by dollars.

In war the financial loss incident to discarding existing equipment no longer matters. Many plants are gutted and can start from scratch with new machines for new purposes. The volume barrier is cracked because government wants quantity. Arbitrarily and independently of the profit system the Government also enormously expands the production of materials and equipment it requires. New tricks in metallurgy, new plastics, new kinds of rubber substitutes appear by magic; wholly new and useful materials, fabrics, and products are synthesized.

Thus the frenzied battle to win in the field of technology compresses the scientific and technological progress of half a century of peacetime into five years of warfare. Why cannot such methods be used during peace? Why must planning end with war?

In his Annual Report for 1913 our first World-War Secretary of Agriculture, the conservative banker David F. Houston wrote: "We have unmistakably reached the period when we must think and plan." He then went on to say that our farm industry must be better integrated into the Nation's economy, and that the recklessness and waste which had characterized our conquest of our land domain must end. Inefficiency, economic waste, unfair market manipulation, and a general lack of plan characterized our agriculture. Meanwhile, Houston wrote, "further production waits on better distribution."

But we did not come out of the war with a planned agriculture or a planned industry. Again, a few days ago, our second world war Secretary of Agriculture, the dirt farmer Claude R. Wickard, said:

"One of the good things that can come from this war is the realization that we *must plan*. The war goals for 1942 proved our capacity—8 million tons of shipping, 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, 58 billion quarts of milk, 50 billion eggs—yes, we can plan all right. The question is: *Will we plan?* Or when the war ends will we, as always before, go back to 'normal?' Will we say again, wiping our hands to symbolize a job well done—'We've won. We've licked them. That's that?' Will it be back to boom and bust, up and down, prosperity and depression? From my heart I hope not, and I think not. I believe we've learned that, costly as war is, poverty and insecurity are worse."

Great Britain is planning right now for post-war conditions. Under the Defense Regulations Act of August 25, 1939, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries was authorized to prevent the use of good agricultural land for other purposes, and to control farm land use for increase of production. In October 1940, the new Ministry of Works and Buildings was established and Lord Reith, an able exponent of planned development, took charge. He began to build a staff for post-war and other planning.

On February 26, 1941, Reith told the House of Lords that his work was predicated on the idea that the principle of planning had been accepted as a national policy, and that a central planning

agency would be established. He declared that a positive policy must be developed on agricultural, industrial, and transport planning. A year later he told Lords and the Government wanted a Ministry of Works and Planning, and the required bill passed Commons on June 2, 1942.

The basic idea is local planning under national direction. It is the function of the Ministry of Works and Planning to consider, from a national standpoint, both wartime and the post-war rationalization of agriculture, transport, strategic materials, health, industries, and their location, and the best land use. The central machinery for planning now exists in Britain. It is hoped there will be international collaboration along planning lines in the post-war period, correlating the industrial and agricultural reconstruction policies of all countries.

Britain also realizes the foolishness of keeping overdeveloped industries alive by subsidies or the prohibition of imports, as these are merely disguised methods of penalizing efficient agricultural and other production. Complex modern society requires the collective performance of many functions that in a simpler society could be performed adequately by individuals. The agencies which perform these functions may be private, part private and part governmental, or wholly governmental. The important consideration is the efficient performance of the function to public satisfaction.

Government and private enterprise are, therefore, integral parts of a single entity. Neither is destined necessarily to obliterate the other. That has always been so. The construction of our American railroads would have been impossible without the free grants of public land made to the roads by Government. The automobile industry could not possibly have prospered without the aid of Government funds and research facilities in the field of public roads.

Industry has always been granted huge benefits in the form of patents, licenses, Government orders, monopolistic grants, tariff duties, and direct subsidies. The so-called capitalistic system has

never been independent of Government aid. There is no break with American tradition whatever in the fusion between private and Government enterprise in the United States. The public here and in Europe has always grown and educated the labor that American manufacturers have freely taken from the market in good times and as freely turned back to private or Government charity in bad times. Thus capitalistic enterprise never actually maintained its own labor pool.

Private industry has always utilized a prankish system of double accounting that did not tell the whole truth. It does not by any means enter in all its legitimate costs of operation as charges against itself. If it did, it would become evident that capitalism never has been a solvent system. It has maintained apparent solvency and actual profits only because it could draw so heavily upon public funds. Throughout the years it has collected from the many and given to the few, while Government has sought increasingly to compensate by taking heavily from the fortunate few and giving to the many.

These actions constitute the rudiments of rational social and economic planning. Industrial plants that we have hitherto regarded as highly efficient because profitable, have often been the ones which have best succeeded in unloading their obligations upon the community. True, some advantages have been passed along to consumers as price reductions and Government has collected some of the profit as taxes for redistribution in the community.

But the thing to be remembered is that private and public enterprise form parts of one whole. It is the institution, public, or private, individual or collective, that shows the highest social efficiency in meeting public needs that we want to develop and sustain. The agency most valuable for promoting the public welfare may be voluntary. It may be run for profit, it may be tax-supported. That does not matter. Planned methods of social performance are what matter. Starving people do not refuse Government aid while they worship at the shrine of private initiative. They never have.

No enterprise or institution is better than the people who operate it either. In the past Government has usually been forced to undertake projects too difficult or too unprofitable to attract private enterprisers. However, we have usually judged private enterprise by its best examples and Government operation by its worst. In recent years, however, private enterprise has been compelled increasingly to seek security in having Government stabilize and control it. Agriculture is already very largely a Governmentally-planned industry. Planning must further permeate our social, economic, and industrial system after the war. If it does not, we cannot say that we won the war.

Book Reviews

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

The University of Texas

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory*.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944, pp.398.)

The early part of this book serves chiefly to give the impression that we were in the war with the Allies from the first, Lend-Lease or no. It is not that the author thinks that our pre-Dunkirk aid greatly helped England and France. In fact, he thinks that this period was more helpful to American defenses since it enabled us to get our war production under way, to develop some new model planes, and to get them into mass production. From the collapse of France to the start of Lend-Lease proper in March, 1941, the chief problem was that of maximum aid to the Allies within the framework of existing law. One method was the Army's return of old rifles to the manufacturer for resale to Britain; the destroyer deal was a more ambitious effort along the same line. Technology brought us together with Britain in an interesting manner. The models of the P-40 ordered by the British and American governments from American manufacturers differed in innumerable small ways that resulted in many headaches for the producers. Finally, representatives of the two governments got together and standardized the design of the plane. Increased production followed immediately. When the British bought other types of military equipment, this same process of standardization took place. This led to exchanges of equipment and experimentation with each other's equipment so that the two armies could be convinced that they were standardizing the most effective item of equipment.

As the sale of war materials to Britain increased, the British supply of dollar exchange and of gold became exhausted. She could not export enough to pay for her arms imports because she had too few factories still producing civilian goods. Lend-Lease grew out of this situation. The dollar was the stumbling block, but the dollar was not the main issue. The important matter was getting planes and ships to the battlefield to stop aggression before it reached the Western Hemisphere. Loans to our allies had proved unworkable in the last war. Hence, the Lend-Lease device.

The book is a remarkable combination of statistical material and human interest. Every page gives some exact figure such as how many sub-machine guns were sent to the Soviet Union in the first

six months of 1942 or how much our plane output increased in 1942 over 1941. However, the factual material is interlarded with stories of how Stettinius rubbed elbows with the world's great. No author ever decreased the sale of a book by being able to tell how he said to Stalin, "'Joe,' I sez, 'you're wrong about that.'" Although Stettinius did not make the Kremlin, he describes his several contacts with Churchill—how "we walked through the little flower garden back of Number 10 Downing Street," how he tried an experimental pinch of snuff from Churchill's silver snuff box, or how the Prime Minister smilingly reproved him for having overlooked the English fat shortage and carved off the fat from the Virginia ham he had presented his host. Further readability is injected into the volume by its inside-on-wartime-Washington aspect. "Gossip" would be the wrong word for it; the author just tells of his dealings with all the bigwigs of Washington in such a manner that one feels that Stettinius could get a job as a columnist if U. S. Steel declined to take him back after the war. Harry Hopkins, ill in his White House bedroom, phones for Stettinius, who finds him "sitting up, working over a pile of papers on a bed-table in front of him." Other notables march across the pages—General Marshall, William Knudsen, the late Lord Lothian, Morgenthau, Stimson, T. V. Soong, Donald Nelson, William Bullitt, Oliver Lyttleton, Robert Sinclair.

The book contains many thought-provoking sidelights with only a indirect bearing on Lend-Lease. In September and October of 1941 the Russian purchasing mission wanted machine tools and raw materials for their own arms factories even more urgently than they wanted American arms and amunitions. They were thinking in terms of a long war and were ordering things that no nation which thought itself on the verge of defeat would have worried about. Or again, during his visit to wartime England the writer observed how much more intensive and mechanized English agriculture had become. He found, too, that tractors are in a large part government-owned and are shifted about constantly from farm to farm as they are needed. If this procedure proves so much more efficient during wartime, one is led to wonder whether post-war British agriculture may not continue some such procedure and thus end up as a less individualistic agriculture.

The most basic idea the book conveys is that all the United Nations have pooled their resources for a battle against a common foe. If this simple fact is grasped, there will never be any question about "what will the United States ever get in return for all this stuff we are giving away?" The Red soldiers took a liking early in the war to the American-made Thompson .45 sub-machine

gun. They killed countless Nazis with the 75,000 of them we sent them in the first year of the war. It is not a question of how much per gun the Soviets owe us; the point is the Russians put the "Tommy guns" to such good use that there were fewer Nazis to meet the Americans on the Normandy beach-head. This same line of reasoning applies to the planes and tanks sent to Russia and to the rest of our allies. It even explains why an American factory is making the high, felt-lined, leather boots that the Red Army men wear in mid-winter. We are fighting a common foe; we pool our resources and each contributes what he has most of; the U. S. has more leather than Russia; and dry-shod Russians can get rid of more Germans. Fortunately the former head of the Tsar's boot factory was located in the U. S., and now the boots are being mass-produced in an American factory.

Pooling of resources implies reverse Lend-Lease. Stettinius explains why reverse Lend-Lease is readily overlooked. Our aid to our allies all clears through Washington and can be readily tabulated. Moreover, it is of a tangible nature e. g., 4000 tanks. Our allies' aid to us takes a form that is harder to compute. A large proportion of American troops have crossed the Atlantic in British transports under the protection of British cruisers and destroyers. When they arrive in the British Isles, they find quarters and operational facilities already prepared for them—barracks, mess halls, canteens, warehouses, airfields, hospitals. Damaged American warships and merchant ships are repaired in British ports without charge.

In reality, it is often hard to distinguish between what is and what is not Lend-Lease. Most RAF bombers were built in British factories, but into these planes went American aluminum and other raw materials, even in some cases American engines and instruments. Then, there was the case of Churchill Hospital near Oxford, which the British have provided for use of the American forces. Someone asked an American colonel whether his X-ray equipment was provided by the British or whether it came from America. "Well," the Colonel said, "the X-ray itself is American. But the plates are all British, and the whole adaptation and installation was done by British workmen. "It's pretty hard to say which is which, but what does it matter anyway? We're here because we don't like Hitler any more than the British do."

The University of Texas

DONALD S. STRONG

Brown, Ralph H., *Mirror For Americans*, (New York: American Geographical Society. Special Publication No. 27, 1943, pp. xxxii, 312, maps, other illustrations.)

According to Brown, there is no contemporary account of the early United States comparable in coverage to the six volume work of the German, Christoph Daniel Ebeling. To meet the lack, at this late date, Brown creates a hypothetical Philadelphian, named Keystone, whom he has write a topical and regional geography of the United States of 1810 much more concise than the work by Ebeling, using only source material available at that time.

Brown becomes a pretty convincing Keystone, to whom the main portion of the volume is credited under the title, *Mirror For Americans, Likeness of the Eastern Seaboard*, 1810. Brown is able to make Keystone present the conditions of the former period without making him obviously a seer. True, Keystone speculates about future developments, but not always correctly, and questions ideas current at the time with scientific caution. The use of old woodcuts, reproductions of old maps, and the language, lend the air of authenticity.

A number of the basic geographical concepts of the present are presented as accepted over a century ago, among them the fall line separating the "region of seasand" and the piedmont, the significance of westerly winds in making the climate of the seaboard more severe than that of western Europe, the idea of Lake Erie having once drained to the Hudson, the destructive effect of tobacco culture in the Chesapeake Bay region, the association of Pennsylvania Germans with big barns and good land. Likely to surprise the usual reader are references to the general unhealthfulness of the inland regions, the use of the equivalent of the United States land survey system in surveying land in western New York, the carrying on of the trade with the Far East mainly by Cape of Good Hope rather than Cape Horn, the representation of the Scandinavian countries and colonies as the chief market for American exports, followed in order by Spain and colonies, Portugal and colonies, and Great Britain and colonies. New York had surpassed Philadelphia as a port, (but not in population), at that time.

The regional treatment is rather unevenly done. For some regions, good general characterizations are presented, with details to illustrate. In other cases, the regional treatment consists largely of a gazeeteer-like listing of places. The Chesapeake Bay region is, perhaps, done best. Lower Canada and East Florida are included for regional treatments, whereas Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, North Carolina, the uplands of South Carolina, and Georgia, except for the country occupied by the Creek Indians, are omitted. Curiously, the Carolina piedmont is considered too

far removed from the seaboard to be included, although the "inlands" of New York are described at some length. Availability of material, one might surmise, as much as logic, governed the choice of regions presented. It might be added that the regions unrepresented in the regional sections are touched very lightly in the topical sections.

Other portions of the book, not credited to Keystone, are: The preface, which includes references to sources and acknowledgment of the financial aid of the patrons of the book; an introduction and prologue concerned largely with a more thorough-going survey of bibliographic material; the bibliography ("Keystone's Library"), and notes at the back, in lieu of footnotes.

Obviously, Brown's contribution will not replace the older accounts. It will, however, be a welcome addition to the reference shelves of classes in the historical geography of the United States, and should prove generally interesting to students of Americana. University of Oklahoma.

LESLIE HEWES

Curran, Kenneth James, *Excess Profits Taxation*. Washington, D. C.: (American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp. viii, 203.)

It was practically a foregone conclusion, as regards both war-time revenue and the moral question of curtailing war profits, that our entry into the war would bring a revival of excess profits taxation. In this timely study, therefore, Professor Curran has undertaken an analysis of the past workings and principles of this tax.

It is mainly a historical study; in fact it is primarily a review of the tax which was levied during the First World War. The idea was advanced at first as a means of getting at the inordinate profits which American munitions makers were garnering out of the European War, and then when we ourselves became involved it was greatly expanded as a war revenue measure.

From the very beginning the tax has suffered from confusion in the minds of its proponents as to its real purpose. If the idea is to tax unduly high profits, then it should be levied on a basis of invested capital; if on the other hand the idea is to tax that share of a corporation's profits which is attributable to war business, then it should be levied on that portion of its profits which exceeds its normal income.

Whichever method of computing the tax is used, it is bound to work some hardship. This was particularly true in 1917-18, when we had had no previous experience with taxation of this type. Theoretically an excess profits tax is an admirably just one, but

it is a tremendously difficult tax to adjust to all concerned so as to achieve substantial justice. For that reason the Treasury called in a group of nationally-known experts and virtually authorized them to interpret and apply the law during its formative stage. This group used a wide degree of discretion in administering the law, but most of its rulings were afterward approved by Congress; although some years later it was criticized by an investigating committee.

After the war the tax was gradually curtailed, and was dropped entirely in 1921, although Woodrow Wilson advocated its permanent incorporation into the tax structure. For the next twelve years there was no such tax in our federal revenue system. Since 1933 we had had several variations of such taxation, mostly on a small scale, and intended as a deterrent to our participation in war. It is rather a sad commentary on our business patriotism that these limitations on the profits of naval and aircraft building had to be repealed before our defense program of 1940 could get under way.

This whole subject is an extremely technical one, and Professor Curran has treated it in a highly technical fashion,—perhaps unavoidably. He is not so much concerned with the policy and theory of the tax as he is with its fiscal features and its administration. Some of the complexity would have been eliminated, however, had the author devoted less attention to the legislative history of the acts he discusses. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that he did not discuss at greater length the undistributed profits tax of 1936, which was an extremely interesting experiment, although unfortunately so short-lived as to give little indication as to results. As to our present excess profits tax, Professor Curran is content to state its main features, declaring, reasonably enough, that so complex a tax, now in operation, must await the future for a balanced appraisal.

University of Oklahoma

J. H. LEEK

Haley, J. Evetts, *George W. Littlefield, Texan*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1943, pp. xiv, 287.)

The life of George W. Littlefield is a success story, the like of which will never be repeated in Texas or probably anywhere else. Born in Mississippi in 1842, he came to Texas nine years later and thereupon began that career which made it appropriate for the author of this biography to give him in its title the accolade, "Texan." Being almost nineteen years old when the Civil War broke out, Littlefield joined the gathering armies of the South

to defend its declared independence, and so deep did his service of two years and a half in this cause embed itself in his consciousness that the author of this biography might equally well have given Littlefield the equally honorable accolade, "Confederate."

Having retired from the army on account of an incapacitating wound he received in East Tennessee the day after Christmas of 1863, Littlefield came back to Texas to engage first in farming and then in the cattle business. The latter reenforced afterwards by banking and land transactions made him the richest man in Texas. The story of his life naturally falls into two parts: the making of his fortune and the disposal of it. The one involves the saga of cows, the other the University of Texas. The author, Mr. Haley, was equally well competent to deal with both. As an active cattle-man, himself, he knows that business in all its ramifications and what is more germane to this book, he knows the lingo of the cow country, a language as distinctive as that of the sea; as a graduate of the University of Texas he has the feel of that educational institution which Littlefield finally adopted as affectionately as he did all his nephews, nieces, other varied kin (having no children of his own), and old Nath, too, that faithful Negro who followed Littlefield from his Civil War battlefields to his lasting resting place.

Littlefield grew up with the cattle business from the time when the long drives were made north into Kansas to the time when the coming of barbed-wire and the small farmer put an end to the free range. His ranches extending from the Panhandle to New Mexico and back again, Mr. Haley details with plenty of cow-boy atmosphere. Littlefield had an extremely keen sense of money-making; whatever he touched seemed to turn to gold. It was only natural, then, that he should add banking to his activities, having already seen what miraculous effects the institution of interest had on a person's financial standing. Having as borrower felt its sting, he would now as lender enjoy its sweets. Thus did he add to his wealth.

On his way to his bank, having to pass by the University he became interested in this institution and as time went on he became greatly attached to it. Soon he was appointed to the board of regents, and it was in this capacity that he became involved in the sorry story of Ferguson's attempt to pollute the University. Though later breaking with Ferguson, still it was in this part of his life that Littlefield shone with least splendor. Then through the gentle but persistent efforts of Dr. E. C. Barker, a member of the History Department, Littlefield was led onto a high moun-

tain of unselfishness and shown what his money could do for the University and especially for the preservation of the records of the old South which Littlefield had never let himself forget. Thus came the munificent gifts of his which made possible the Littlefield Fund for Southern History and through it the bringing together in the University of one of the richest collections of material dealing with Southern history, anywhere.

Littlefield has been only a name heretofore to most people; Mr. Haley has now made Littlefield a Confederate soldier, a farmer and cattle man, a banker and land operator, a kind and considerate though business-like friend to all his kin and associates, and a benefactor to the University of Texas.

The University of Texas.

E. M. COULTER

Binkley, Wilfred E., *American Political Parties, Their Natural History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, pp. xi, 407, xii.)

American Political Parties combines the techniques of the historian and the political scientist. It is an analysis of the social and economic anatomy and physiology of our major political parties—Federalist, Jeffersonian Republican, Democratic, Whig, and Republican—as cross-sectional, —class, and —special interest combinations or coalitions. In the case of each party, the causes of its formation and the circumstances under which it took shape are carefully set forth with emphasis upon the various and often divergent “factions” or interest groups which were drawn into the combination, and, as the party’s subsequent history is traced, constant attention is directed to the shifting character of these component parts, which in the course of time worked remarkable transformations in all major parties and which brought about the complete disintegration of the Federalist, Jefferson Republican, and Whig parties. These durable coalitions of diverse elements, which American major parties have always been, are not explained, however, as the results exclusively of blind and irresistible social and economic forces. The part played by party organizers and leaders is strongly emphasized. Hamilton, Jefferson, Jackson, Clay, Calhoun, Douglas, Lincoln, Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt are given full credit for being experts in the art of integrating the group combinations that constitute major political parties.” Indeed, these men and others less prominent, who have been master intersectional and inter-group diplomats and who have found the formulas which have united and held together these complex organizations, receive major attention as great manipulators of the social and economic forces which have determined the nature of American politics.

While successive elections and the chronology of political events are given due attention in their proper order, they are not, as in other party histories, given primary consideration. The stress is rather upon the forces, interests, and leadership behind the events. Strict chronological order is sacrificed by the consideration of particular parties or periods in the history of such parties in separate chapters. This method of presentation enables the reader to grasp more clearly the significance of the role the party played in the politics of the time, but it results in his having some difficulty in seeing the over-all picture of the period as a whole. It may be added that students of contemporary politics will be somewhat disappointed by the fact that the party history of the last forty years is telescoped into a brief fifty-odd pages out of a total of 389 pages of text. Moreover, while characterizations, analyses, and general conclusions with respect to the nature of our party system are scattered throughout, the book would have been strengthened by a summary chapter in which they could have been brought together.

Superior though this book may be both as to approach and up-to-date scholarship, it can scarcely be called original. Its general thesis respecting the nature of major parties and their leaders has been hitherto advanced by many writers and has long had wide acceptance. Few, however, have brought it forward so clearly. The presentation is for the most part objective; the writer occasionally injects his personal bias in favor of the party which at a particular time seems more clearly to have stood for the interests of the "forgotten man." In *the main*, however, the book deserves whole-hearted commendation.

The University of Texas

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS.

Notestein, Frank W., and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*. (Geneva: League of Nations, 1944, pp. 315.)

This book gives a series of facts and forecasts concerning the populations of Europe and of Soviet Russia. The present situation is described in some detail and future trends are outlined to 1970.

The countries of northwestern Europe have led the way in the reduction of natality, a change which has now progressed to the point where these countries are no longer reproducing themselves. After a generation or so of fairly stable populations, they face a steady decline, unless long-time trends are reversed soon. Similar patterns of population change are manifesting themselves in other European countries and in Russia, but in these countries,

especially in Russia, the condition already existing in Northwestern Europe will not be reached for several decades. One of the consequences is that the population of Eastern Europe and Russia will become both absolutely and relatively much larger than they are at present. Pressure upon the West will follow as an inevitable result.

The two recent great wars centering in Europe will have profound effects upon the sex and age composition of the population as well as upon total numbers. For Europe and Soviet Russia combined, the loss attributed to World War I has been estimated at 48 million. To this loss will be added the losses of the current war and the effects of both will be felt for many years to come.

They will form a part of the process of demographic change through which the areas studied are coming to have populations significantly different from those of the recent past. Thus war losses contribute to the lowering of birth rates by eliminating potential fathers. The lowered birth and death rates result in an aging population with still further decreases of persons in the reproductive ages. Problems of manpower will arise as the workers become older and as larger and larger proportions of the working population approach the age of retirement. For a time the increased burden of old age dependency will be offset by a decrease in child dependency, but ultimately there will appear an increase in dependents relative to those who must support them. Throughout there will be special problems in the female population as trends lead to excess numbers of women, many of them unmarried, many childless, many of them economic competitors in a man's world.

In discovering and presenting these matters the authors of *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* have performed a great service. The result is a volume of inestimable worth to those who may be interested in planning for the post-war world.

The University of Texas

CARL M. ROSENQUIST

Lawton, George, (Ed.), *New Goals for Old Age*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xi, 210.)

Among the significant consequences of the increase in the number of old persons in the population is the rise of an interest in the problems of old age. This interest first manifested itself as a part of the social security movement, taking the form of a concern for the economic welfare of the aged members of society. We have been forced to recognize, however, that the old man, like the young one, does not live by bread alone, that, as a matter of fact, aged persons are people no less than the population at large.

In *New Goals for Old Age*, George Lawton, editor, has brought together a series of articles by fourteen authors, each dealing with some aspect of old age. The problem of adequate income, formerly the only problem of old age dealt with by writers, is scarcely touched upon in this book. Instead, major emphasis is placed upon the adaptations required of old persons and of society by reason of the changes in physique and mentality which are the inevitable accompaniments of advancing years.

In general these changes may be described as a slowing up of the individual's rate of performance, a slowing up which ultimately requires the individual to adjust himself to a role of reduced speed, responsibility and importance. In the past the practice has been to eliminate the old person altogether as soon as he is unable to maintain the standard pace. This practice is presented in the book under review as a serious mistake. Old persons, though not as fast as younger ones, may yet be able to participate in social and economic activities geared to their capacities. By providing for such participation, society can profit from the contributions of its elderly members and at the same time prevent the personal maladjustments which so frequently follow "retirement." What is needed, it appears, is a gradual adaptation of conditions to the aging individual, instead of a sudden cessation of activity on his sixty-fifth or seventieth birthday.

The book as a whole presents an able plea for the sympathetic consideration of the problems of the aged and the aging. It will doubtless be succeeded by many others as the significance of its subject becomes more apparent to the reading public.

The University of Texas

CARL M. ROSENQUIST

Book Notes

Claudius O. Johnson's third edition of *Government in the United States*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1944, pp. xii, 852) is a complete revision without departing substantially from the approach used in the earlier editions. Most of the historical background prior to 1787 has been omitted, thus eliminating the chapter on "The Foundations of America Government;" the chapter entitled "The Federal System" has been reorganized as a chapter on "The Distribution of Governmental Powers;" and two chapters, "Government and Labor" and "Agriculture and Conservation," are expansions of the former single chapter dealing with these matters. Two new chapters on "The United States at War" and "The Obligations of Citizenship" constitute additions of real merit, the latter especially pointing up a matter that has been to much neglected in texts in this field. Much new material on various subjects has been introduced to bring up to date a very complete and usable treatment.

H. A. C.

Very properly a great deal of attention has been paid to labor in recent years. Dr. McNaughton's study (*The Development of Labor Relations Law*, by Wayne Leslie McNaughton, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, pp. 197, is merely another survey of the evolution of labor law, and does not add greatly to material already available. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the book is its emphasis on the period 1930-1940. Even so, it does not give a current picture, because so much has happened since the copyright date, 1941. There is, of course, no discussion at all of the war problem and the agencies created to meet it. There is, however, a very competent survey of developments in the New Deal decade, treated from the standpoint of employers, employees, and the public.

J. H. L.

On the seventeenth of June, 1936, John Bassett Moore, eminent international lawyer and one time Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, played the role of the returning native and addressed the graduating class at his home-town high school in Smyrna, Delaware. The address accounts for the first twenty-two pages of *Commencement Address by John Bassett Moore at the Dedication of the John Bassett Moore High School together with a Bibliography of His Writings* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, pp. 503. The remainder of the volume is devoted to a truly impressive bibliography of Judge Moore's writ-

ings. Twenty-eight pages are required to record Moore's varied intellectual output, which ranges from his lecture in 1891 before the Nineteenth Century Club of New York which bore the intriguing title of "The Ethics of Mob Violence" down to his book reviews which have appeared as recently as 1943.

D. S. S.

War and Postwar Adjustment Policies, (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, pp. 131) by Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock starts with the text of the report written by Baruch and Hancock and submitted to War Mobilization Director Byrnes. It is a concise document dealing with reconversion and the transition to a peacetime economy. Reports supplementary to the main report and filed with Byrnes at a later date bear such titles as "Settlement of Terminated War Contracts," "Surplus Property," "Tightening the Mobilization Machine."

D. S. S.